ECON30005 Money and Banking
ECON30005 Overview
- University of Melbourne
- S1 2027
- 13 chapters
- Economics
ECON30005 Money and Banking is the University of Melbourne's third-year, intermediate subject in the Department of Economics that sits at the intersection of macroeconomics and finance.
- Assessed by Tutorial participation 10% · Pre-tutorial Canvas quiz 10% · Assignment 1 10% · Assignment 2 10% · Final examination 60%
- Key terms Quantity theory of money (MV = PY), Money neutrality, Money multiplier, Diamond-Dybvig demand-deposit contract
- How to prepare Treat ECON30005 as a small set of models you can reproduce under pressure rather than a reading subject…
- Most asked Where can I find past exam papers / practice for ECON30005?
How ECON30005 is assessed
| Component | Weight | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Tutorial participation | 10% | In-class participation, weekly from Week 2 (attend at least 10 of 11 tutorials, 1 mark each) |
| Pre-tutorial Canvas quiz | 10% | Weekly online quiz from Week 2; five MCQ/true-false on the previous week's lectures, due 10am Monday (raw score ×1.25, capped at 10) |
| Assignment 1 | 10% | Group written assignment (up to 4 students, ~800 words), due Week 6 — confirm the date on Canvas |
| Assignment 2 | 10% | Group written assignment (up to 4 students, ~800 words), due Week 11 — confirm the date on Canvas |
| Final examination | 60% | 2-hour closed-book end-of-semester exam (true/false, short essays and a worked model); Casio FX82 permitted |
What ECON30005 covers
The subject runs across a 12-week semester in teaching order, from what money is and how it is measured through to central banking, the GFC and the international monetary system.
Continuous assessment — weekly Canvas quizzes, tutorial participation and two group assignments — carries 40%, while a 2-hour closed-book examination in the examination period carries 60% and must be passed on its own (a 50% hurdle) to pass the subject, so your WAM in ECON30005 turns on exam mastery.
Use SWOTVAC to drill the OLG, Diamond-Dybvig and Taylor-rule models that recur across true/false, short essays and the worked question.
Money: Definitions, Functions and Evolution
Functions of money · monetary aggregates M1/M2/M3 · ADIs · (Week 1)Week 1 sets the vocabulary the whole subject is written in: the economic definition of money (anything generally accepted in payment), its three functions, and how it is measured.
- The economic definition of money: anything generally accepted as payment for goods and services or repayment of debts (distinct from wealth or income)
- The three functions of money: medium of exchange (resolves the double coincidence of wants), unit of account (N prices instead of N(N−1)/2), store of value (differs by liquidity)
- Desirable characteristics: standardised, divisible, portable, durable, widely accepted
- Evolution: commodity money → fiat money → cheques → electronic payment → e-money → cryptocurrency, stablecoins and CBDCs
- US Fed aggregates: M1 = currency + demand and other liquid deposits; M2 = M1 + small time deposits + retail money-market funds
- RBA aggregates: currency; M1 = currency + current deposits; M3 = M1 + other bank deposits + credit-union/building-society deposits; broad money = M3 + other deposit-like borrowings
Money Demand and the Quantity Theory of Money
MV=PY (Fisher) · Keynesian liquidity preference · portfolio theory · (Week 2)Week 2 derives the demand for money three ways: the classical quantity theory via the equation of exchange MV=PY, Keynes's liquidity-preference theory with its transactions, precautionary and speculative motives, and portfolio theory.
- The equation of exchange MV = PY: an identity that becomes a theory of inflation when V is stable and Y is at potential
- Implied classical money demand M = (1/V)PY — proportional to nominal income, independent of the interest rate
- Growth-rate form: gM + gV ≈ π + gY, so with V constant π ≈ gM − gY
- Keynesian liquidity preference: transactions, precautionary and speculative motives → M/P = L(i, Y), increasing in Y, decreasing in i
- The nominal interest rate as the opportunity cost of holding money
- Portfolio theory: asset demand rises with wealth, expected relative return and liquidity, falls with relative risk
A Simple OLG Model with Money and Money Neutrality
Overlapping-generations model · price determination · long-run neutrality · (Weeks 2-3)Weeks 2-3 build the subject's central structural model: an overlapping-generations (OLG) economy where the young save in capital and real money balances and consume when old.
- The OLG environment: two-period-lived generations, work when young, consume when old, save in capital and real balances
- Utility from real balances and old-age consumption: u = θ·log(m/P) + (1−θ)·log(c_o)
- Budget constraints and the first-order condition giving money demand m/P = θ(1 + 1/i)w
- Money demand rises with income w and falls with the nominal interest rate i — the Keynesian result, derived analytically
- The exact nominal rate (1 + i) = (1 + r)(1 + π) versus the Fisher approximation i ≈ r + π
- Price determination: P = M/[N(w − k)], nominal money over the real goods the young sell
Inflation: Short-Run Non-Neutrality, Costs and Hyperinflation
Money growth ↔ inflation · velocity · costs of inflation · (Week 3)Week 3 connects money growth to inflation.
- The long-run money-growth/inflation correlation (McCandless-Weber) and 'inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon'
- Long-run neutrality vs short-run non-neutrality: an unanticipated injection can have real and distributional effects
- Who bears an unexpected injection in the OLG model: the current old lose purchasing power (inflation as an implicit tax on money)
- Growing money supply M_{t+1} = (1+z)M_t: steady-state inflation equals the money-growth rate z
- Quantity-theory decomposition of inflation: Δlog P = Δlog M + Δlog V − Δlog Y
- Costs of inflation: distorted pricing, redistribution from debtors to creditors, efficiency loss, uncertainty when volatile
Banking and Financial Intermediation
Adverse selection · moral hazard · core banking functions · (Week 4)Week 4 explains why financial intermediaries exist.
- The flow of funds: direct finance (securities) vs indirect finance (via an intermediary); indirect finance dominates
- The eight basic facts about finance (banks are the main external funding source; collateral and covenants are pervasive)
- Three fundamental frictions: transaction costs, risk in lending, asymmetric information
- Adverse selection (before lending): the lemons problem — the riskiest borrowers are keenest to borrow
- Moral hazard (after lending): borrowers take hidden actions that raise default risk
- How banks address the frictions: economies of scale, screening, incentive-compatible contracts, monitoring, diversification, relationship banking
Money Creation Through Banking
Bank balance sheet · asset transformation · money multiplier · (Week 5)Week 5 shows how banks create money. The bank balance-sheet identity (assets = liabilities + capital) and asset transformation set the stage; then making a loan simultaneously creates a matching deposit, so the money supply rises.
- The bank balance-sheet identity: total assets = total liabilities + bank capital
- Assets (reserves, securities, loans) and liabilities (deposits, borrowings, capital) — loans are the largest asset
- Asset transformation: banks borrow short and lend long, transforming maturity, liquidity, risk and size
- Loans create deposits: a new loan simultaneously credits a matching deposit, raising the money supply
- Interbank settlement: paying another bank moves reserves, but the deposit stays in the system and money stays elevated
- The modern view: lending is not reserve-constrained; reserves adjust, and many economies have no reserve requirement
Banking Risk and Financial Regulation
Liquidity/credit risk · bank capital · capital requirements · (Week 5)Week 5 catalogues the risks banks run — credit and solvency risk, liquidity risk and runs, interest-rate risk, plus operational and systemic risk — and explains why bank capital is the cushion that absorbs losses.
- Credit risk and solvency risk: default losses eat capital; negative net worth means insolvency
- Liquidity risk and the run chain: funding stress → fire sales → loss of confidence → bank run
- Interest-rate risk: borrowing short and lending long at fixed rates; present value p = D/(1+i)^t falls when rates rise (SVB 2023)
- Operational and systemic risk (contagion through interbank links, common exposures and fire sales)
- Bank capital as a loss-absorbing cushion; the resilience-versus-return-on-equity trade-off
- Basel III capital requirements: leverage ratio ≥ 3%, CET1 ≥ 4.5%, Tier 1 ≥ 6%, CAR ≥ 8%, +2.5% conservation buffer
The Diamond-Dybvig Model of Bank Runs
Liquidity insurance · demand-deposit contract · multiple equilibria · (Week 6)Week 6 works through the Diamond-Dybvig model: patient and impatient savers face liquidity shocks, and a bank pools funds to offer a demand-deposit contract (c1, c2) that insures against them, characterised by the first-order condition u′(c1) = βR·u′(c2) subject to the resource constraint.
- The environment: N savers, a fraction θ hit by an impatience (liquidity) shock, a project returning 1 if liquidated early and R > 1 if held to maturity, with βR > 1
- Autarky: impatient consume 1, patient consume R, each bearing liquidity risk alone
- The demand-deposit contract (c1, c2): withdraw c1 in period 1 or c2 in period 2
- The resource constraint (1−θ)c2 = (1 − θc1)R and the first-order condition u′(c1) = βR·u′(c2)
- The optimal allocation satisfies 1 < c1 < c2 < R — risk sharing smooths consumption across types
- Liquidity creation and liquidity insurance: impatient get more, patient get less than autarky, everyone better off ex ante
Central Banking and the Tools of Monetary Policy
OMO · interest on reserves · policy rate · the Taylor rule · (Week 7)Week 7 covers the structure of central banking and the monetary-policy toolkit: open-market operations, the discount rate, interest on reserves, and unconventional tools (QE, forward guidance), organised as a chain from tools to instruments to intermediate targets to goals.
- Core central-bank functions: conduct monetary policy, issue currency, lender of last resort, payments, banker to government
- Central-bank independence: goal independence versus instrument/operational independence, and its link to lower, more stable inflation
- The policy rate as an overnight interbank/reserve rate (US federal funds rate; Australia's cash rate)
- Open-market operations: repos, reverse repos and outright purchases/sales to steer the policy rate
- The discount rate as a ceiling and interest on reserves (IOR) as a floor — the corridor for the policy rate
- Reserve requirements (zero in the US since 2020 and in Australia) and why they are no longer the main lever
Monetary Transmission, Expectations and Inflation Targeting
Transmission channels · New Keynesian model · time-inconsistency · (Week 8)Week 8 explains how policy-rate changes reach output and inflation through the interest-rate, asset-price, exchange-rate and credit channels, with expectations of future real rates at the centre.
- Transmission channels: the traditional interest-rate channel (r ↓ ⇒ investment ↑ ⇒ demand ↑), plus asset-price, exchange-rate and credit channels
- The central role of expected future real rates and the Fisher relation r = i − π with sticky prices
- The New Keynesian dynamic IS curve: the output gap depends on the expected future gap and the real-rate/natural-rate gap
- The NK Phillips curve π_t = β·E_t(π_{t+1}) + κ·ŷ_t — forward-looking, unlike the static Phillips curve
- Why expectations amplify credible policy, and why a promise of low future rates can stimulate today (even at the zero lower bound)
- Inflation targeting: a public numerical target, commitment, transparency and accountability as a nominal anchor
The Global Financial Crisis: Securitisation and Shadow Banking
Originate-to-distribute · tranching · repo/ABCP · policy responses · (Week 9)Week 9 dissects the global financial crisis.
- Why banking innovated: deposit-rate deregulation, competition from commercial paper and money-market funds squeezed traditional banking
- Securitisation mechanics: origination → transfer to an SPV → tranching (senior/mezzanine/equity) → credit enhancement → rating → issuance → cash-flow waterfall
- Re-securitisation into CDOs and CDO-squared, and the resulting opacity and interconnectedness
- Originate-to-hold vs originate-to-distribute: selling loans weakened screening and monitoring incentives
- Shadow banking: credit intermediation outside the regular, regulated banking system
- Wholesale funding: repo (repo rate, haircuts) and asset-backed commercial paper as short-term, run-prone funding
Exchange Rates and the International Financial System
Nominal vs real depreciation · PPP · the policy trilemma · (Week 10)Week 10 covers exchange-rate determination and the international monetary system. It distinguishes nominal from real exchange rates and shows, via purchasing power parity, why domestic prices rising faster than foreign prices can offset a nominal depreciation.
- Nominal exchange rate (foreign currency per unit of domestic): a rise is appreciation, a fall depreciation; the trade-weighted index
- Real exchange rate e_R = e·P/P* — the relative price of domestic goods; a rise reduces exports and stimulates imports
- Purchasing power parity: the law of one price, e = P*/P, and in changes %Δe_R = %Δe + π − π*
- Why a nominal depreciation need not be a real depreciation if domestic inflation outpaces foreign inflation
- Determinants of exchange rates: long run (relative prices, productivity) and short run (relative expected returns, interest rates)
- Exchange-rate regimes: fixed, floating and managed float; the gold standard and Bretton Woods
Emerging-Market Crises: The Asian and Twin Crises
Current-account reversals · currency + banking twin crisis · FX debt · (Week 11)Week 11 analyses emerging-market financial crises, above all the Asian crisis of 1997-98. It explains why several Asian economies ran large current-account deficits that reversed sharply during the crisis, and the twin-crisis dynamic in which a currency depreciation and a banking crisis reinforce each other.
- Current-account deficits financed by capital inflows, and the sharp reversal (sudden stop) when confidence collapses
- Currency crisis: intense pressure on a currency causing sharp depreciation, reserve loss or the collapse of a peg
- Twin crisis: a banking crisis and a currency crisis occurring together — common in emerging markets
- Common vulnerabilities: fixed exchange-rate pegs, heavy short-term foreign borrowing, unhedged foreign-currency debt
- Maturity mismatch and currency mismatch, often sustained by expected government bailouts (moral hazard)
- Why FX-denominated debt turns a depreciation into a banking crisis (liabilities rise in domestic-currency value)
It follows one through-line — how the financial system channels savings into intermediation, credit and money creation, liquidity provision, and ultimately investment, inflation and output — across four blocks.
Weeks 1-3 build the theory of money: its three functions and evolution, the measurement of monetary aggregates (US M1/M2 and the RBA's currency/M1/M3/broad money), the quantity theory MV=PY and Keynesian money demand, and the overlapping-generations (OLG) model that delivers long-run money neutrality alongside short-run non-neutrality and the economics of inflation and hyperinflation.
Weeks 4-6 turn to banking and intermediation: why asymmetric information (adverse selection and moral hazard) makes intermediaries necessary, how banks create money by lending, the money multiplier 1/(required reserve ratio), banking risk and Basel-style regulation, the costly-state-verification model of the optimal debt contract, and the Diamond-Dybvig model of liquidity insurance and self-fulfilling bank runs.
Weeks 7-8 cover central banking and monetary policy: the toolkit (open-market operations, interest on reserves, the policy rate), the Taylor rule, the monetary transmission mechanism, the New Keynesian model, inflation targeting and time-inconsistency.
Weeks 9-11 close with financial crises and the international system: the global financial crisis and securitisation, exchange rates and the policy trilemma, and emerging-market twin crises. This subject is decided by its final exam.
Continuous assessment — tutorial participation (10%), weekly pre-tutorial Canvas quizzes (10%) and two group assignments (10% each) — carries 40%, and a 2-hour closed-book end-of-semester examination worth 60% carries a hurdle: you must score at least 50% on the final exam itself to pass the subject, however well you did on the coursework.
The exam runs three sections (true/false, short essays and a worked model) and a Casio FX82 calculator is permitted. Confirm the current assessment structure, weights and exam timing on Canvas and the UniMelb Subject Guide; your ECON30005 result feeds the Weighted Average Mark (WAM) that later economics subjects build on.
Worked example · free
The costly-state-verification optimal debt contract (Section 3 archetype)
- +2Role of the bank. With many small lenders, monitoring is a public good — everyone free-rides or everyone duplicates the cost. A bank arises as a delegated monitor: it takes deposits promising the gross rate R_d, lends the whole B under a standard debt contract with a fixed promised repayment D, and verifies only when the entrepreneur defaults. Debt is optimal under costly state verification because it needs monitoring only in the default state, not in every state (as equity would).
- +2Bank payoff by state. In the high state the entrepreneur can repay, so the bank receives D. In the low state the entrepreneur defaults; the bank pays K to verify and seizes what is left, y_L − K = 70 − 12 = 58. Monitoring occurs only in default.
- +2Zero-profit condition. Competition drives the bank's expected profit to zero: p·D + (1−p)(y_L − K) − R_d·B = 0. Substitute: 0.75·D + 0.25·(58) − 1.05·(70) = 0.
- +2Solve for D. 0.75·D + 14.5 − 73.5 = 0 → 0.75·D = 59 → D = 78.67. (Check the contract is genuine: y_H = 150 > D = 78.67, so repayment is feasible in the good state, and y_L − K = 58 < D, so default is a real loss.)
- +1Gross lending rate. R_L = D/B = 78.67/70 = 1.1238, i.e. a net lending rate of about 12.4%. The spread over the 5% deposit rate compensates the bank for expected default losses and monitoring costs.
- +1Comparative static (net worth 30 → 50). A higher net worth means a smaller loan (B = 50), so the bank's loss in the default state is smaller and it needs a smaller spread to break even: the lending rate falls. This is the 'skin in the game' result — borrower net worth lowers the external-finance premium.
Key terms
- Quantity theory of money (MV = PY)
- The equation of exchange: money supply M times velocity V equals the price level P times real output Y. Always true as an identity; it becomes a theory of inflation once V is assumed stable and Y is at potential, giving π ≈ money growth − output growth.
- Money neutrality
- The proposition that a one-off, permanent change in the money supply changes only nominal variables (the price level rises equiproportionately) and leaves real variables — output, capital, the real interest rate — unchanged. It holds in the long run in the OLG model; short-run non-neutrality can arise from unanticipated injections.
- Money multiplier
- The maximum expansion of deposits from an injection of reserves in the textbook model: 1/(required reserve ratio). A ceiling, not a mechanism — the modern view is that bank lending creates deposits and reserves adjust, and several economies (including Australia) have no reserve requirement.
- Diamond-Dybvig demand-deposit contract
- A contract (c1, c2) that pools depositors' funds to insure against idiosyncratic liquidity shocks: impatient depositors withdraw c1 in period 1, patient depositors receive c2 in period 2, with the optimum characterised by u′(c1) = βR·u′(c2) and satisfying 1 < c1 < c2 < R. It creates liquidity but admits a self-fulfilling bank-run equilibrium under sequential service.
- Taylor rule
- A monetary-policy reaction function: i = π + r* + w_π(π − π*) + w_y(y − y*). The Taylor principle requires w_π > 0 so nominal rates rise more than one-for-one with inflation, raising the real rate to stabilise inflation.
- Policy trilemma (impossible trinity)
- A country can have only two of: a fixed exchange rate, free capital mobility and independent monetary policy. Fixing the rate with open capital markets forces the domestic policy rate to track the anchor country's, so monetary independence is lost.
ECON30005 FAQ
Is ECON30005 hard?
It is demanding because it fuses macroeconomic theory with finance and leans on a handful of models you must be able to derive, not just describe — the overlapping-generations (OLG) money model, the costly-state-verification debt contract and the Diamond-Dybvig bank-run model are the ones students find hardest.
The mathematics is intermediate (single-variable optimisation, the Fisher relation, geometric series for the money multiplier), and the exam rewards clean, mark-by-mark working over memorised prose. Because the final exam is worth 60% and carries a 50% hurdle, breadth matters: you need to be able to start every topic.
Students who redo the OLG, CSV and Diamond-Dybvig derivations each week — rather than cramming them in SWOTVAC — tend to find it manageable, and steady work protects your WAM.
Can AI help me with ECON30005?
Yes, as a step-by-step study aid. Sia is an AI tutor built to mirror how ECON30005 is actually taught and assessed at the University of Melbourne: it can walk you through an OLG money-demand derivation, a money-multiplier calculation, a Diamond-Dybvig (c1, c2) problem or a Taylor-rule computation one line at a time, and it checks your reasoning as you go.
Bring your own tutorial or past-paper question and ask Sia to explain each step. It does not do graded assessment for you — University of Melbourne academic-integrity rules apply to the quizzes and assignments — so use it to understand the method, not to produce work you submit.
Where can I find past exam papers / practice for ECON30005?
Start on Canvas, where the subject posts its exam-preparation material, including the practice exam that states it follows 'the same format and similar coverage as the final exam', and search the University of Melbourne Library's past-examination collection for any released papers. Your weekly tutorial questions and their solutions are the closest match to the short-essay and worked-model sections.
This guide also includes a re-authored practice exam that mirrors the paper's shape — a true/false section, short essays and a worked model such as the costly-state-verification contract — with fresh numbers, and you can ask Sia to generate extra practice in the same style and explain each step. Treat any third-party 'model answers' with caution and confirm what is officially provided on Canvas.
What are the ECON30005 hurdles and assessment rules?
The confirmed hurdle is the final exam: you must score at least 50% on the 2-hour closed-book end-of-semester examination to pass the subject, no matter how well you did on the 40% of continuous assessment.
That continuous assessment is tutorial participation (10%, attend at least 10 of 11 tutorials at 1 mark each), a weekly pre-tutorial Canvas quiz (10%, five questions on the previous week's lectures due 10am Monday, raw score scaled ×1.25 and capped at 10) and two group written assignments (10% each, up to four students, about 800 words). A Casio FX82 calculator is permitted in the exam.
Confirm the exact weights, due dates and permitted materials on Canvas and the UniMelb Subject Guide, since details can change year to year.
What is on the ECON30005 final exam?
A single 2-hour closed-book paper worth 60 marks that spans the whole subject, following the practice-exam pattern in three sections: Section 1, true/false statements (about 20 marks) across the syllabus — quantity theory, OLG neutrality, hyperinflation and velocity, modern money creation, Diamond-Dybvig belief-driven runs, interest on reserves, inflation targeting, the trilemma and foreign-currency debt; Section 2, short-essay questions (about 30 marks, roughly five at six marks each) asking you to explain a mechanism; and Section 3, a worked model (about 10 marks) such as the costly-state-verification optimal debt contract, the OLG steady state or the Diamond-Dybvig contract.
A Casio FX82 calculator is permitted. The exam sits in the University of Melbourne Semester 1, 2027 examination period (around June 2027) — confirm the exact date, time and room on Canvas and the UniMelb exam timetable.
Questions students ask in each ECON30005 chapter
- How is money different from wealth or income?
- Money is the narrow set of things generally accepted in payment — currency and spendable deposits. Wealth is a stock of all stores of value (money plus bonds, shares, property), and income is a flow received per period. A statement that 'a rich person has a lot of money' confuses wealth with money; in this subject money is the means of payment, not net worth. Chapter 01 · Money: Definitions, Functions and Evolution
- Why is MV = PY an identity but the quantity theory a theory?
- MV = PY is true by construction: velocity is defined as PY/M, so the equation always holds. It becomes the quantity theory of money — a theory of inflation — only once you add assumptions: that velocity is stable (set by transaction institutions) and that real output is at its full-employment level. Under those assumptions changes in the money supply map into proportional changes in the price level. Chapter 02 · Money Demand and the Quantity Theory of Money
- Why does a permanent money increase leave the real economy unchanged?
- Because steady-state capital per worker is determined by preferences and technology (θ, α, A) and contains no money term. Since capital pins down the real wage and the real interest rate, those are unchanged too, and with the real goods the young sell fixed, the price level P = M/[N(w − k)] simply scales with M. Nominal money and prices rise together, so real balances and every real variable are unchanged. That is long-run neutrality. Chapter 03 · A Simple OLG Model with Money and Money Neutrality
- How can money be neutral in the long run but not the short run?
- In the long run a permanent, anticipated money increase scales all prices and leaves real variables unchanged — neutrality. In the short run an unanticipated injection can have real effects because behaviour was set before the surprise: in the OLG model the current old are stuck holding money that now buys less, so they lose while the recipient of the new money gains. Whether output moves depends on who receives the injection — a subsidy to the young raises their capital and temporarily lifts output. Chapter 04 · Inflation: Short-Run Non-Neutrality, Costs and Hyperinflation
- What is the difference between adverse selection and moral hazard?
- Timing. Adverse selection happens before the loan is made: because borrowers know their own type and lenders do not, the applicant pool is skewed toward the riskiest projects (the lemons problem). Moral hazard happens after the loan is made: once the borrower has the money, they may take hidden actions that raise the chance of default. Banks fight selection with screening, collateral and covenants, and hazard with monitoring and covenants. Chapter 05 · Banking and Financial Intermediation
- How can banks 'create' money just by lending?
- When a bank approves a loan it does not hand over someone else's cash; it credits the borrower's deposit account, creating a new deposit and a matching loan asset at the same instant. Since deposits are money, the money supply rises by the loan amount. If the borrower spends the money at another bank, reserves move between banks but the deposit stays in the system, so the money stays created. This 'loans create deposits' view is how modern money creation actually works. Chapter 06 · Money Creation Through Banking
- Why is bank capital so important?
- Capital is the buffer that absorbs losses before depositors and other creditors are hit. When loans go bad, the losses first reduce equity; only if losses exceed capital does the bank become insolvent. So a well-capitalised bank can weather a downturn, while a thinly capitalised one fails at the first shock. The trade-off is that more capital lowers return on equity, which is why banks resist holding it and why regulators mandate minimums. Chapter 07 · Banking Risk and Financial Regulation
- Why does the bank contract make everyone better off than going it alone?
- Because savers are risk-averse and do not know in advance whether they will be impatient or patient. Under autarky an impatient saver is stuck with the low early-liquidation value 1 and a patient saver gets the full R, a risky spread. The bank pools funds and offers (c1, c2) with 1 < c1 < c2 < R, raising the low outcome and lowering the high one. Since the depositor values the smoother allocation, expected utility is higher ex ante — that is liquidity insurance. Chapter 08 · The Diamond-Dybvig Model of Bank Runs
- How does a central bank actually set the policy rate?
- By managing the market for reserves. In a corridor or floor system the central bank uses open-market operations (mostly repos and reverse repos) to adjust reserve supply, and it sets standing-facility rates — interest on reserves as a floor and the discount rate as a ceiling — so that the overnight interbank rate settles at target. It does not decree the rate directly; it makes the target rate the market-clearing rate for reserves. Chapter 09 · Central Banking and the Tools of Monetary Policy
- Why do expectations matter so much in the New Keynesian model?
- Because both key equations are forward-looking. In the Phillips curve, firms that can reset their price only occasionally set it based on expected future inflation, so with β near one a change in expected inflation passes almost one-for-one into current inflation. In the IS curve, forward-looking households base spending on the whole expected path of real rates. Iterating the equations makes today's output and inflation depend on the entire expected future, which is why credibility and commitment are decisive. Chapter 10 · Monetary Transmission, Expectations and Inflation Targeting
- How did securitisation change banking before the GFC?
- It shifted banking from originate-to-hold to originate-to-distribute. Traditionally a bank kept the loans it made, bore the credit risk, and therefore screened borrowers carefully. Securitisation let banks pool loans, tranche them, and sell them as MBS and CDOs, which freed funding, transferred risk to investors and cut regulatory capital. But because originators no longer held the risk, their incentive to screen and monitor weakened, and strong investor demand for highly rated products fuelled lax underwriting and excess lending — especially subprime — setting up the crisis. Chapter 11 · The Global Financial Crisis: Securitisation and Shadow Banking
- How can a currency depreciate in nominal terms but appreciate in real terms?
- Because the real exchange rate also depends on relative prices: e_R = e·P/P*, so %Δe_R = %Δe + π − π*. If domestic inflation exceeds foreign inflation by more than the nominal depreciation, the real exchange rate rises even though the nominal rate fell. For example a 6% nominal depreciation with domestic inflation 10 points above foreign inflation gives a 4% real appreciation. The lesson is that competitiveness depends on the real, not the nominal, exchange rate. Chapter 12 · Exchange Rates and the International Financial System
- Why does foreign-currency debt make a depreciation so dangerous?
- Because it creates a currency mismatch. A bank or firm with unhedged foreign-currency debt but domestic-currency assets sees the domestic value of its liabilities jump when the currency depreciates, while its assets do not keep pace. Net worth can go from positive to negative purely from the exchange-rate move, turning a currency crisis into a banking crisis. This is the core reason the Asian crisis, with heavy short-term dollar borrowing under pegs, was so destructive. Chapter 13 · Emerging-Market Crises: The Asian and Twin Crises
How to study for the exam
Treat ECON30005 as a small set of models you can reproduce under pressure rather than a reading subject, and rehearse them weekly rather than in SWOTVAC.
Build a one-page derivation sheet for the three exam-critical models — the OLG money model (budget constraints, the money-demand equation m/P = θ(1 + 1/i)w, price determination P = M/[N(w − k)], and why steady-state capital does not depend on M), the costly-state-verification contract (zero-profit condition, solving for D, the lending rate D/B, and the net-worth comparative static), and Diamond-Dybvig (the resource constraint, the FOC u′(c1) = βR·u′(c2) and the ordering 1 < c1 < c2 < R) — and redo each from a blank page every week.
Drill the small calculations that recur in true/false and short essays: the exact nominal rate (1 + i) = (1 + r)(1 + π) versus the Fisher approximation, the money multiplier 1/rr, the Taylor rule, and PPP real-versus-nominal depreciation.
For the short-essay section, practise structured mark-by-mark answers (why intermediation exposes banks to risk; how securitisation changed banking pre-GFC; the Asian-crisis current-account reversal) — two to four scorable points each. Because the exam carries a 50% hurdle, cover breadth first so you can attempt every question, then deepen the models you find hardest.
When a step will not click, ask Sia to explain that single step a different way and set you a fresh practice question in the same style; it teaches the method and checks your reasoning, and it never substitutes for your own graded work. Confirm the exam date, room and permitted materials on Canvas and the University of Melbourne exam timetable.
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