ECC1000 Cheatsheet · Principles of microeconomics

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ECC1000
Principles of microeconomics
Monash University · Undergraduate · Semester 2, 2026 · Exam revision sheet · Side 1
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SIDE 1/2   DEFINITIONS → FORMULAS → DECISION RULES → DIAGRAM VERDICTSEXAM REVISION SHEETFinal: readings + pre-workshop material + workshops for every week

0 · Exam mapcourse.json · BRIEF

Exercise 20%Quiz / Test 30%Examination 50%

Permitted materials: not confirmed for this offering in the course materials we hold — check the exam instructions on the LMS.

ComponentWhat the data says
Exercise20%; pre-workshop + workshop work
Quiz / Test30%; quizzes + supervised in-class tests
Examination50%; on campus, invigilated, electronic assessment platform

The final covers the readings, pre-workshop material and workshops for every week. Revision therefore has to connect each diagram to its assumptions, calculation and verdict—not memorise labels alone.

1 · Six licencesCh 1 · topic map

SCARCITYchoiceopportunity costmarginincentivestrade gainsequilibriumWhich principle licenses the claim?
Scarcity is the root; each branch licenses a different conclusion.
IdeaSentence it earns
ScarcityUsing a resource rules out another use.
Opportunity costCount the next-best alternative forgone.
MarginChoose one additional unit at a time.
IncentivesChanged rewards change behaviour.
TradeSpecialise by comparative advantage.
EquilibriumNo one gains by moving alone.

Check A model is not a photograph. Name the assumption switched on, then state the conclusion that assumption earns.

2 · PPF verdictsCh 1 · frontiers

A: efficientB: inefficientC: infeasiblegood Xgood Y
On = efficient; inside = inefficient; outside = infeasible today.

Straight frontier|slope| = opportunity cost of horizontal good in units of vertical good

3 · Trade methodCh 1 · comparative advantage

For each producerOC of X = max Y / max X
OC of Y = max X / max Y

Riverina 9/9Coastal 4/8panels (000)grain (000 t)9894
Higher total output does not settle comparative advantage; the slopes do.
  1. Compare maxima → absolute advantage.
  2. Write all four opportunity costs with units.
  3. Lower cost → comparative advantage → specialise.
  4. Terms of trade for the sold good must lie between the two opportunity costs.
QuestionCorrect test
Who can make more?Absolute advantage: output.
Who should specialise?Comparative advantage: opportunity cost.
Will both trade?Rate strictly between both costs.

Trap In a two-good setting costs are reciprocals: one producer cannot have comparative advantage in both goods unless costs are identical, in which case neither gains.

4 · Costs & profitCh 2 · cost method

AmountMeaningInclude?
ExplicitMoney outlay: rent, wages, materialsYes
ImplicitValue of owned time/assets in next-best useYes
SunkAlready incurred, unrecoverableNo
Paid either waySame under all live optionsNo
money out?explicitforgone?implicitsum botheconomic costrevenue − economic costcompare with best alternative
Either–or questions compare full opportunity cost, not bank movements.
ProfitRule
AccountingRevenue − explicit costs.
EconomicRevenue − explicit − implicit costs.
3+ optionsCompare a pair; discard the negative-economic-profit option; test the survivor against the next.

5 · How much?Ch 2 · marginal rule

Marginal benefit is what the next unit adds to total benefit; marginal cost is what it adds to total opportunity cost, including implicit cost.

Whole-unit stopping ruleTake each unit while MB ≥ MC.
Choose the last integer unit that still pays.
Reject the next unit when MB < MC.

MCMBQ*$/unitquantitytake units
Left of Q*: the next unit adds value. Right: it destroys value.
WordingMethod
Choose one optionEconomic profit; eliminate pairwise.
Choose quantity/hours/unitsCompare MB and MC unit by unit.
“Already spent …”Exclude if unrecoverable.

Check Do not stop at the visual crossing if quantities are indivisible. Test the last accepted unit and the first rejected unit.

6 · Budget mechanicsCh 3 · affordability

Two goods X and YBudget constraint: PₓX + PᵧY ≤ I
Budget line: PₓX + PᵧY = I
X-intercept = I/Pₓ · Y-intercept = I/Pᵧ
|slope| = Pₓ/Pᵧ (Y per X)

feasible: ≤ Iline: = II/PₓI/PᵧXY
The region is affordable; the boundary spends the whole income.
ShockDiagramHeld fixed
Income changesParallel shift; both intercepts move proportionallyPrice ratio / slope
Price of X changesPivot at Y-interceptI and Pᵧ
Price of Y changesPivot at X-interceptI and Pₓ

7 · Utility optimumCh 3 · optimal bundle

Utility ranks bundles; one util has no standalone meaning and does not compare wellbeing across people. Marginal utility is the change in total utility from one more unit, normally diminishing as consumption rises.

Optimal affordable bundleMUₓ/Pₓ = MUᵧ/Pᵧ
If MUₓ/Pₓ > MUᵧ/Pᵧ → spend more on X, less on Y.
Whole units: no single affordable swap raises total utility.

MUₓ/Pₓreturn/$ on XMUᵧ/Pᵧreturn/$ on Ycomparespend toward higher ratiostop: equal / no better swap
Compare satisfaction per dollar, never raw marginal utility.
ObjectDefinition / use
BundleCollection of goods consumed.
Utility functionTotal utility for each possible bundle.
Marginal utilityChange from one additional unit.
Feasible setEvery bundle satisfying expenditure ≤ income.

8 · Two exchange ratesCh 4 · MRT/MRS

Put both in the same unitsMRT = price ratio = Pₓ/Pᵧ
MRS = marginal-utility ratio = MUₓ/MUᵧ
Interior optimum: MRS = MRT
⇔ MUₓ/Pₓ = MUᵧ/Pᵧ

If X is horizontal and Y vertical, both rates say “units of Y surrendered for one more X”. Write that sentence before inserting numbers; reversing one ratio reverses the decision.

IC₁IC₂A: steepB: flatterXY
Higher curves are preferred; MRS diminishes as X replaces Y.
Read from curveExam sentence
Same curveBundles deliver equal total utility.
Higher curvePreferred under monotonicity; not a measurable utility gap.

9 · Preference logicCh 4 · properties

PropertyWhat it buys the diagram
CompleteEvery pair of bundles can be ranked.
TransitiveConsistent ranking; curves cannot cross.
ContinuousCurves are unbroken.
MonotonicMore preferred; curves slope down; higher is better.
ConvexMixtures beat extremes; diminishing MRS; tangency is a maximum.

Without convexity, the best affordable bundle may be a corner; a tangency need not be the maximum.

kink = restricted balanceordinary lineeligible goodsother goods
A restriction bends the boundary; it does not change total payment.

Kinked-constraint test

  1. Unrestricted portion caps spending on other goods.
  2. Constraint is flat until the restricted balance is used, then takes the ordinary slope.
  3. Eligible-goods intercept is unchanged.
  4. Restriction binds only someone who otherwise chose less than the restricted amount of eligible goods.

10 · Price decompositionCh 5 · fixed order

beforeaftercompensatedABCA→B substitution · B→C income
New line → compensated parallel → intermediate bundle → final bundle.

After a price rise in XSubstitution effect: away from dearer X; direction guaranteed.
Income effect: real purchasing power falls. Normal X → less X; inferior X → more X.
Total: sign only after classifying X and comparing magnitudes.

Good after Pₓ risesSubstitutionIncomeTotal
Normal X−−−

11 · Work–leisureCh 5 · time budget

Time endowment is fixed; work converts time into wages and wages into consumption. Free time is a good whose opportunity cost is the wage, so the wage is the slope/MRT.

wage 30wage 2024 h720480free timeconsumption
A wage rise pivots about 24 hours; a day is still a day.
Wage riseDirection
Substitution effectFree time dearer → less free time → more work.
Income effect, free time normalHigher purchasing power → more free time → less work.
Net hoursAmbiguous without relative magnitudes.

Trap “Higher wage means more hours” overstates the model. Name both effects and which must dominate for the stated result.

12 · Games: solve, then judgeCh 6 · two-pass scan

Game = players + strategies + order + information + payoffs. Simultaneous play means neither observes the other's choice; full information means both know all options and payoffs.

PASS 1columns fixedPASS 2rows fixedOVERLAPNash cell(s)write (row action, column action)no unilateral profitable deviation
Best responses are conditional; scan each player independently.
TestQuestion
Best responseHighest own payoff against one fixed rival action?
DominanceSame best action whatever rival does?
NashBoth best-responding in one cell?
Pareto efficiencyCan any other cell improve someone without harming anyone?

Stability ≠ desirability. A prisoner's-dilemma equilibrium can be Pareto dominated. Coordination can yield two equilibria and no prediction between them. Public-goods free riding is the dilemma with symmetric players: contributing costs privately while benefits are shared.

Policy changes behaviour only by changing payoffs: add a private cost to withholding, a reward for contributing, or an individual component. If the grid is unchanged, the best responses and equilibrium are unchanged.

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ECC1000v2 · 2026-10-25
Monash Semester 2 final assessment period, 2–18 November 2026 (check your personal exam timetable).
Check your exam instructions on the LMS for what you may bring; use this sheet to revise and self-test.
ECC1000
Self-test drills · answer path before answer
Worked numbers · judgement cards · classic traps · Exam-morning plan · Side 2
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SIDE 2/2   FIVE WORKED DRILLS · IF YOU SEE X → DO Y · TRAPS · RAPID RECALLSELF-TEST BEFORE READINGAnswer pattern: classify → formula/diagram → numbers → verdict sentence

13 · Method chooserCh 1–6 · topic maps

WHAT MUST BE CHOSEN?one optionquantitybundle/gamePROFITexplicit +implicitMARGINMB vs MClast unitCONSTRAINTbudget/ICpayoff gridtrade: 4 OCs → specialise → terms
Classify the decision before calculating; fluent use of the wrong method earns the wrong answer.
If you see …Do …
Two maxima / two producersFour OCs → comparative advantage → trade interval.
Owned time, premises, equipmentPrice the forgone use as implicit cost.
One more unit/hourCompare MB and MC.
Income/prices + two goodsWrite the budget equation and intercepts.
MU and pricesCompute MU/P for each good.
Payoff gridTwo best-response passes; then efficiency.

14 · Drill 1: PPFCh 1 · worked example

Q. Island: maximum 400 t fruit or 100 t fish; straight frontier. Current output: 200 t fruit and 30 t fish. Classify and find OC of 1 t fish.

actual: (200,30)frontier: (200,50)400 fruit100 fish
At 200 fruit the frontier permits 50 fish; actual fish is 20 below it.

Answer pathHalf of 400 fruit used → frontier fish = 50.
30 < 50 → inside; inefficient.
100 fish ↔ 400 fruit → OC(1 fish) = 4 fruit.

Verdict: 20 more tonnes of fish are available with no fruit loss at the current point. On the frontier, each extra tonne of fish costs 4 tonnes of fruit.

14A · PPF/trade recallCh 1 · fast check

PromptRecite before moving on
Point inside?Inefficient: more of at least one good is possible without sacrifice.

15 · Drill 2: tradecourse worked example

Q. Riverina: 9,000 t grain or 9,000 panels. Coastal: 4,000 t grain or 8,000 panels. Find both advantages and the mutually beneficial price of one panel.

RiverinaCoastal9 panels89 grain4
Same axes make absolute output and relative slopes visible together.
ProducerOC 1 panelOC 1 t grain
Riverina1 t grain1 panel
Coastal0.5 t grain2 panels

AnswerAbsolute: Riverina in both outputs.
Comparative: Coastal in panels; Riverina in grain.
0.5 < price of 1 panel < 1 tonne of grain

Coastal will not accept less than 0.5 t grain per panel; Riverina will not pay more than 1 t. Write both refusal bounds, not a single arbitrary rate.

16 · Drill 3: economic profitCh 2 · worked example

Q. Revenue $145,000; salary forgone $78,000. A rents for $34,000, buys supplies $26,000, hires staff $46,000. B owns the premises (rent forgone $34,000) and family labour forgoes $46,000.

Version AVersion B
Explicit34 + 26 + 46 = 106k26k
Implicit78k78 + 34 + 46 = 158k
Opportunity cost184k184k
Accounting profit145 − 106 = 39k145 − 26 = 119k
Economic profit145 − 184 = −39k
Change in storyAccounting treatmentEconomic treatment
Rent becomes owned premisesExplicit cost falls 34kImplicit rent rises 34k
Paid staff becomes unpaid family labourExplicit cost falls 46kImplicit wage rises 46k
ResultAccounting profit rises 80kOpportunity cost and economic profit unchanged

17 · Drill 4: MU per $Ch 3 · worked example

Q. Income $48. Tea costs $3, meal $8. At the current bundle, next tea gives 12 utils and next meal 40 utils. Is this optimal?

GoodMUPriceMU/$Move
Tea12$34Buy less
Meal40$85Buy more

Answer pathTea: 12/3 = 4 utils per dollar.
Meal: 40/8 = 5 utils per dollar.
5 > 4 → not optimal; shift spending tea → meals.
Net gain per dollar moved = 5 − 4 = 1 util.

As meals increase, their MU falls; as tea decreases, its MU rises. Ratios converge. With whole units, the finish is the bundle from which no single affordable swap improves total utility.

18 · Same drill, slope formCh 4 · worked example

Q. Fish cost $3, apples $1. At the current bundle MU fish = 15, MU apples = 6. Optimising?

Use apples per fish throughoutMRT = Pfish/Papple = 3/1 = 3 apples/fish.
MRS = MUfish/MUapple = 15/6 = 2.5 apples/fish.
Market demands 3; consumer offers 2.5 → fish are too dear.
Buy fewer fish and more apples.

current bundleMRT 3 > MRS 2.5fewer fishfishapples
Same units first. A reciprocal in only one rate produces the opposite verdict.

Trap “A meal/fish gives more utility” is insufficient. Price it. “Steeper IC means X is always valued more” is also too broad: MRS is local to the bundle.

19 · Budget-line speed checkCh 3 · model 3.1

Income $60; lunch remains $12; coffee rises $4 → $6.

BeforeAfter
Coffee intercept60/4 = 1560/6 = 10
Lunch intercept60/12 = 560/12 = 5
VerdictPivot inward about the unchanged lunch intercept.

20 · Price-change cardCh 5 · worked example

Q. A budget staple's price rises; for this household it is inferior. Sign each effect and the total.

ABCA→B: relative price · B→C: purchasing power
Construct the intermediate point; neither component is observed separately.
StepStaple purchasesWhy
LineOwn intercept inwardOnly its price rose.
SubstitutionDecreaseRelatively dearer; utility fixed.
IncomeIncreaseReal purchasing power fell; inferior good.
TotalAmbiguousEffects oppose; larger magnitude wins.

Four-mark answer spinepivot + fixed intercept → substitution direction → income direction with good type → total conditional on magnitudes

Classic error Never write “income fell”. Money income is unchanged; its command over bundles fell.

21 · Wage-rise judgementCh 5 · work–leisure

higher wagelower wage24 hfree timeconsumption
Only the consumption intercept rises; the free-time intercept stays at the time endowment.
If question asks …Write …
Why pivot?Wage changes the price of free time; 24 hours fixed.
Substitution effect?Less free time, more work.
Income effect?If free time normal: more free time, less work.
Net hours?Cannot sign without dominance of one effect.

23 · Drill 5: cafe gameCh 6 · worked example

Q. Two cafes choose Open early or Stay closed. Open alone pays 8; both open pay 3 each; both closed pay 5 each; closed against an open rival pays 1.

COLUMN CAFEOpenClosedROW CAFEOpenClosed3, 3 ★8, 11, 85, 5★ both best responses: Nash
Payoffs are (row, column). Scan row choices down columns, then column choices across rows.

Answer pathAgainst Open: Open pays 3 > 1.
Against Closed: Open pays 8 > 5.
Open is dominant for both → unique Nash = (Open, Open), payoff (3,3).
(Closed, Closed) pays (5,5) → Nash is not Pareto efficient.

Neither cafe can reach (5,5) alone: unilateral closing against Open gives 1. This is the prisoner's-dilemma structure.

24 · Grid judgement cardsCh 6 · FAQ

ROW PLAYERhold columnsCOLUMNhold rowsOVERLAPNashtest dominance + Pareto separatelydo not infer welfare from equilibrium
Mechanical scan first; story, labels and policy interpretation second.
If you see …Conclude …
One action best in every rival caseDominant; eliminate dominated action.
Two mutual best-response cellsTwo Nash equilibria; model alone does not choose.
Another cell better for both than NashNash is Pareto dominated.
Contribute costs privately; benefit sharedCheck free-riding / public-good dilemma.
Sequential rather than simultaneousOrder of play changes the treatment; do not use simultaneous-choice wording.

25 · Fast definitionsglossary

Best response: own highest-payoff action against one fixed rival action. Nash: no profitable unilateral deviation. Pareto efficient: no improvement for one without harm to another. Dominant: preferred whatever the rival does. Symmetric: all players face identical strategies and payoffs.

26 · Classic trapsFAQ + worked tips

TrapOne-line correction
Use output to assign specialisationOutput gives absolute advantage; OC gives comparative.
Count a cost paid either wayOnly differences between alternatives enter OC.
Ignore owned resourcesUse their next-best earnings as implicit cost.
Continue because much was spentUnrecoverable past cost is sunk; compare remaining MB and MC.
Compare raw MUsDivide each MU by its price.
Call an interior bundle optimalWith monotonicity, unspent income can buy more.
Invert one exchange rateWrite common units, e.g. apples per fish.
Say money income fell after a price riseReal purchasing power fell; money income did not.
Sign inferior-good total automaticallySubstitution and income effects oppose; compare magnitudes.
Equilibrium = good outcomeNash is stability; Pareto is a separate welfare test.
Answer auditQuestion to ask
1 · ClassifyWhat kind of point, choice or game is this?
2 · Hold fixedIncome, price, utility or rival action?
3 · Show unitsGrain/panel, apples/fish, utils/$?
4 · VerdictDirection, model conclusion and any condition?

28 · Exam-morning planBRIEF · study strategy

OrderRetrieval task
DrawPPF, budget line, indifference map, payoff grid.
ReciteEight rules: costs, margin, slopes, optimum, effects, best responses.
SolveTwo drills without looking; correct the first wrong step.
CheckLMS instructions and personal timetable.
TradeFour OCs → lower cost specialises → terms strictly between costs.
ConsumerIntercepts first; common units; MU/$ equality or MRS = MRT.
PriceNew line → compensated line → substitution → income → total only if magnitudes permit.
GameTwo response passes; write (row, column); test dominance and Pareto separately.
  1. Redraw PPF, budget line, indifference map and 2×2 payoff grid from assumptions.
  2. Recite both exchange rates, MU/$ equality, profit equations, marginal rule and best-response scan.
  3. Do the trade drill and one consumer/game drill without looking; mark the first wrong step.
  4. Check the LMS exam instructions and personal timetable.

Final sentence Name what was held constant, state the direction, attach units, and give the model's verdict—plus any condition that keeps the sign ambiguous.

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ECC1000v2 · 2026-10-25
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Check your exam instructions on the LMS for what you may bring; use this sheet to revise and self-test.

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