ECC3640 Cheatsheet · Economics of Climate Change

Monash University · Cheatsheet for the final exam. Monash Semester 2 final assessment period, 2–18 November 2026 (check your personal exam timetable). Full ECC3640 study guide →

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ECC3640
Economics of Climate Change
Monash University · Level 3 · Semester 2, 2026 · CLOSED-BOOK MEMORY SHEET
ECC3640 cheatsheet QR code – open the full ECC3640 study guide
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SIDE 1/2   EXAM MAP · DEFINITIONS · FORMULAS · DECISION RULES · COMPARISONSCarry it in your head40% final eExam · no hurdle requirement

0 · Exam map Course + Week 13

1810622440% final
Weekly Discussion Forum 18% · Workshop Contributions 10% · Practice Quizzes 6% · Policy Brief Plan 2% · Policy Brief 24% · Final E-exam 40%.

“The final exam is a closed-book, fully invigilated eExam.” — ECC3640 Week 13 Exam page, Moodle 2026 (MD_Week_13_Exam.md)

Format: four extended-matching parts × five questions; each fully correct answer = 2 marks; 40 marks total. Predict the concept from the launch pad, test every option against its exact wording, count required selections, then remove unsupported extras.

PriorityFinal boundary
Rehearse hardEvery topic with a practice quiz except Science (week 2) and Stabilisation (week 7).
Use as contextScience and Stabilisation are foundations but excluded under the current notice.
Policy briefEnterprise-driven decarbonisation has no weekly quiz and supports the brief.
Recall test → Before looking down, say: mechanism → evidence → decision rule → limitation. Recognition is not recall.

1 · Damage chain Ch 2 · examinable

hazardimpactadaptvaluedamage gross − avoided = residual
Do not price a hazard directly: identify exposure, adaptation, valuation boundary and residual loss.

Exposure = people/assets/ecosystems where hazard can affect them. Vulnerability = susceptibility, shaped by sensitivity and capacity to cope. Damage function maps a climate variable to economic loss under stated assumptions.

Audit: baseline and horizon? gross or post-adaptation? market plus non-market? population and price basis? thresholds? regional distribution? A dollar loss, percentage of output and mortality-risk change are not interchangeable.

Equal hazards need not mean equal welfare damage. Income, infrastructure, sector mix, population and adaptive capacity differ. Aggregate GDP can hide concentrated loss and values without market prices.

LayerWhat a good option says
Physical impacthealth, ecosystem, infrastructure or production change before pricing
Market valueobservable output/income effect, with boundary stated
Non-market valuehealth, biodiversity, amenity or culture valued by another method
Residual damageharm left after adaptation; do not count avoided loss again

2 · Climate CBA Ch 3 · core model

Policy variable: atmospheric concentration G. Total cost = climate damage + abatement cost. Tighter policy moves G toward reference G₀: damage falls, abatement cost rises.

Quadratic Quiggin frameworkDamage = kD(G − G₀)²
Abatement cost = kA(GBAU − G)²
MD = 2kD(G − G₀)
MAC = 2kA(GBAU − G)

Interior optimumMD = MAC
G* = (kA × GBAU + kD × G₀) ÷ (kA + kD)
P* = MD(G*) = MAC(G*)

MD ↑MAC ↓G*P*MD = MAC
Interior minimum: tighten if MD > MAC; loosen if MAC > MD. A boundary solution is possible if curves do not cross feasibly.
ChangeDirectionReason
kD ↑G* ↓ toward G₀extra concentration is costlier
kA ↑G* ↑ toward GBAUtight control is costlier
discount rate ↑damage side tends ↓distant loss gets less present weight
omitted non-market loss addeddamage side ↑boundary widens

Check both margins and that G₀ ≤ G* ≤ GBAU. The model gives a calibrated shadow value, not an observed tax or permit price and not a physical threshold.

Assumptions carried by the result

Reference concentration fixes the damage anchor; business-as-usual concentration fixes the abatement anchor; kD and kA set curvature. Discounting, risk, non-market value and baseline growth affect the damage side. Technology and transition assumptions affect the abatement side.

Weighted-average intuition: G* sits between the two anchors. A larger coefficient gives its associated anchor more weight: larger kD weights G₀; larger kA weights GBAU. This is the fastest direction check.

Boundary case: equality identifies only an interior optimum. If MD and MAC do not cross inside the feasible interval, compare total cost at the relevant boundary rather than forcing the formula to describe an infeasible target.

3 · Time, risk, equity Ch 4 · core

Discrete present valuePV = Future amount ÷ (1 + r)ᵗ
Higher r or longer t → lower PV

Ramsey ruler = δ + ηg
δ = pure time preference
η = elasticity of marginal utility
g = consumption growth

Interpret: δ gives later utility less weight simply because it is later; ηg reflects diminishing marginal utility if future people are richer. Arithmetic is technical; parameter choice is empirical and ethical.

same $10,000 loss in year 302% → PV $5,5225% → PV $2,314r ↑PV ↓
The physical loss is unchanged; only its present weighting changes.

Risk is not deep uncertainty

RISKknown / estimableprobabilities → EVDEEP UNCERTAINTYmodel or distributiondisputed → robustnessambiguity increases →
Expected value needs defensible probabilities; robustness, learning and precaution matter when structure itself is uncertain.

Expected valueEV = Σ probability(state) × consequence(state)

Fat tail: enough probability on extremes that rare catastrophic loss can materially affect expected welfare, especially with irreversibility or limited adaptation. Do not infer “uncertainty = no action” or “uncertainty = maximal action”; match the rule to the uncertainty.

Robustness answer in four moves

  1. Identify states, probabilities or competing model structures.
  2. Show welfare under each, including an extreme-loss state where relevant.
  3. Ask whether the preferred action survives plausible alternatives.
  4. Use learning, staging or an adaptive trigger when revision has value.

Precaution is not a free conclusion. Explain asymmetry, irreversibility or fat-tail loss. Waiting is not free either: current damage, lock-in and lost options can accumulate while information improves.

4 · Cooperation game Ch 5 · examinable

Global public good: mitigation benefits are broadly non-rival and difficult to exclude. Efficient provision adds marginal benefits vertically across countries, while a government considering only domestic benefit tends to underprovide.

Free-riding: enjoy others’ mitigation while avoiding own cost. A prisoners’ dilemma can make mutual withholding individually stable even though mutual contribution is jointly better.

Country BCountry AContributeWithholdContributeWithhold 6, 61, 88, 13, 3joint best = C,C · Nash equilibrium = W,W
Circle each best response first; only then name the Nash equilibrium and compare joint welfare.

Solve any payoff table1 Against each action by the other, choose own higher payoff.
2 Intersection of best responses = Nash equilibrium.
3 Sum payoffs to find joint-welfare maximum.
4 Explain the gap; propose an institution that changes it.

Design featureChannel changed
Monitoring / transparencyinformation about performance
Repeated interaction / reciprocityfuture payoff and expectations
Finance / transferscurrent contribution cost + distribution
Club benefit / penaltyreward from withholding
Review cyclelearning and later ambition
pledgemonitorreviewratchet
Participation alone does not prove success: assess ambition, implementation, credibility and behaviour.

Equity principles: capacity, historical responsibility and vulnerability must become an operational contribution or finance rule.

Architecture evaluation

DesignTrade-off
Broad participationcoverage improves; weak voluntary commitments may leave a collective-action gap
Stringent obligationsstronger commitments; harder to negotiate or enforce

5 · Instrument chooser Ch 7 · core

Hold the environmental target constant. A policy may look cheap only because it covers fewer emissions or delivers less reduction. Under certainty, price and quantity can be calibrated to the same outcome.

RuleQ certainP certainrevenueTaxlowhighyesETShighlowauctiontax: price · ETS: quantity
Free allocation changes wealth and public revenue; the permit’s opportunity cost can preserve the marginal signal.
InstrumentStrengthWatch
Standarddirect performance/technology rulemay not equalise MAC; information burden
Taxprice certainty + revenueemissions quantity adjusts
Subsidytargets selected reductionsfinance, additionality, expansion
ETSquantity certainty + tradeprice volatility, allocation, market power

Cost effectivenessFor a fixed aggregate target, rank marginal abatement units lowest to highest. Flexible sources abate until MACᵢ = common tax or permit price. At the optimum: MAC₁ = MAC₂ = …, subject to monitoring and constraints.

MACflat MB → Psteep MB → Qabatement$/u
Relative-slope rule under uncertain abatement cost: flat marginal benefit favours price; steep marginal benefit near a threshold strengthens quantity control.

Implementation gate: coverage · liable entity · measurement · baseline · enforcement · transaction cost · market power · revenue use · distribution. Hybrid designs can limit extreme price or quantity outcomes.

One-sentence instrument defences

6 · Policy mechanism audit Ch 8 · examinable

Start with the chain, not the programme name: objective → regulated/supported entity → emissions boundary → baseline → target → compliance unit → enforcement → behavioural response → measured outcome.

technologyinputsdemandlocationWhich decisions does the policy actually reach?
Broad coverage helps only if emissions are measurable and the responsible decision-maker can respond.
TestMemory sentence
AdditionalityWould the claimed reduction occur without the incentive?
BaselineIs the counterfactual inflated, unstable or manipulable?
LeakageDid production/emissions move outside the boundary?
DistributionHouseholds, regions, competitiveness, revenue recycling.
DurabilityCan investors plan long-lived low-emissions assets?

Leakage risk ↑ when production is trade-exposed, emissions cost is material, relocation feasible and foreign production at least as emissions-intensive. Crediting integrity needs measurement, reporting and verification; participation alone never proves additionality.

7 · Adaptation decision Ch 10 · examinable

AUTONOMOUSprivate adjustmentinsurance · cropstiming · designPOLICY-DRIVENpublic coordinationinfrastructure · infozoning · financeshort-run protection ↔ long-run transformation
Public action bites where spillovers, information, infrastructure, finance, land use or equity block efficient private adjustment.

Mitigation changes future hazard; adaptation changes exposure, vulnerability or consequences. They are complements. Appraise: consistent horizon and prices → expected avoided damage → cost → residual risk → spillovers → non-market effects → distribution → robustness.

Adaptation valueAvoided damage = expected harm without measure − expected residual harm
NPV = PV(avoided damage) − present intervention cost

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ECC3640
Economics of Climate Change · Self-Test Drills
Monash University · Level 3 · Semester 2, 2026 · CLOSED-BOOK MEMORY SHEET
ECC3640 cheatsheet QR code – open the full ECC3640 study guide
Full guide + ask Sia about ECC3640
SIDE 2/2   FIVE WORKED DRILLS · IF X → DO Y · CLASSIC TRAPS · EXAM-MORNING PLANAnswer before checkingExtended matching · formula + interpretation + limitation

8 · Drill 1: solve G* Ch 3 worked example

Given: kA=0.20, kD=0.30, G₀=360 ppm, GBAU=660 ppm. Compute target, verify both margins, interpret.

numerator132+108=240denominator0.20+0.30=.50targetG*=480 ppmMD=.6(120)=72MAC=.4(180)=72
Every number follows from the printed formula; equality is the error check.
  1. G*=(.20×660+.30×360)/(.20+.30).
  2. Numerator =132+108=240; denominator =.50.
  3. G*=480 ppm, inside [360,660].
  4. MD=2×.30×(480−360)=72.
  5. MAC=2×.20×(660−480)=72.

Interpret: at this calibration, total modelled damage plus abatement cost is minimised. It is not scientific certainty and P*=72 is a modelled marginal value, not necessarily a market price.

Self-checkPass?
Correct anchors and minus signsMD uses G−G₀; MAC uses GBAU−G
Directionhigher kD should pull G* down
FOCMD must equal MAC
Trap → Swapping kA and kD in the weighted average reverses the sensitivity story.

8b · Rapid oral prompts Ch 3 FAQ

MD>MAC? Tighten. MAC>MD? Loosen. No feasible intersection? Check a boundary. Point estimate fragile? Run sensitivity. Carbon value vs tax? Shadow value ≠ observed price.

kD ↑G* ↓toward G₀kA ↑G* ↑toward GBAU
Say the curve/weight movement before stating the policy direction.

Option-set filters: reject “optimal concentration = safe concentration”; reject “P* is today’s market price”; reject a sensitivity answer that changes two inputs at once; reject a claim that a point estimate is robust merely because the algebra is exact.

Full-credit verbal check: “Holding other inputs fixed, the higher damage coefficient increases the weight on the lower reference concentration, so the preferred concentration falls. The numerical size still depends on calibration.”

9 · Drill 2: discount Ch 4 worked example

Given: one avoided loss of $10,000 in 30 years; 1.02³⁰=1.811, 1.05³⁰=4.322.

Formula before numbersPV = Future amount ÷ (1+r)ᵗ

$5,522$2,3142%5%PV
Same future loss, different present weights: higher r reduces PV.
  1. At 2%: 10,000÷1.811 ≈ $5,522.
  2. At 5%: 10,000÷4.322 ≈ $2,314.
  3. Difference comes from intertemporal weighting, not changed future physical damage.
  4. Debate δ and ηg; do not choose r to force a preferred answer.
If prompt says…Do…
probabilities suppliedcompute EV, then discuss tails/irreversibility
probabilities disputedrobustness, precaution, learning, adaptive policy
future people richerexplain ηg, not pure time preference
aggregate benefit positivestill analyse incidence and compensation

9b · Classic category traps Ch 4 practice

  • Discounting changes weight across time.
  • Risk attaches known/estimable probabilities.
  • Deep uncertainty disputes distribution or model.
  • Equity asks who bears costs and receives benefits.

Do not use the four terms as synonyms. An option that slides between them without an argument is overbroad.

Equity and tails: fast judgements

If a low-probability state has enormous irreversible loss, show its expected-welfare contribution and explain why the central estimate may be insufficient. If probabilities themselves are disputed, do not fabricate an EV: compare robust performance across plausible structures.

ClaimAudit
“Higher r means less physical damage”false: it means lower present weight
“Future people richer”connect to ηg; distribution may still be unequal
“Positive aggregate NPV”ask who loses, whether compensation is feasible
“Small probability”combine with consequence; inspect fat tail

10 · Drill 3: allocate abatement Ch 7 worked example

Given successive MACs: A = 2,4,6,8,10,12; B = 1,3,5,7,9,11. Achieve six units at minimum total cost.

123456B1A1B2A2B3A3
Select marginal units globally, not each firm’s average cost.
  1. Order all units: B1=1, A1=2, B2=3, A2=4, B3=5, A3=6, ….
  2. Choose first six ⇒ each firm abates three.
  3. Efficient cost = 1+2+3+4+5+6 = 21.
  4. Rigid A5/B1 cost = 2+4+6+8+10+1 = 31.
  5. Saving = 31−21 = 10, same aggregate abatement.

Source audit: the chapter’s step list gives rigid cost 31; its answer line says 41 and saving 20. The printed marginal costs verify 31 and 10. Trust the recomputation.

Economic explanationA common tax or permit price directs more abatement to lower-MAC opportunities until marginal costs are equalised.

PromptResponse
tax vs cap under certaintycan calibrate either to same outcome
flat MB, steep/uncertain MACprice stronger
steep MB near thresholdquantity stronger
free permitsrents change; marginal opportunity cost can remain
subsidycheck finance, additionality, output expansion
Trap → “Cheaper” is meaningless unless the environmental targets match.

Implementation stress test

After the textbook allocation, reopen reality: Can emissions be measured? Is coverage upstream, facility-based or narrow? Can firms adjust the priced margin? Are permits enforceable? Could market power distort trade? Do transaction and administrative costs overturn the ranking?

Design choiceDistribution / integrity effect
auction permitspublic revenue; marginal cap signal retained
free permitsscarcity rents transferred; opportunity cost may remain
recycle tax revenuechanges household/industry incidence

11 · Drill 4: mitigation game Ch 5 worked example

Payoffs: mutual contribution (6,6); free-rider gets 8, sole contributor 1; mutual withholding (3,3).

BACWCW6,61,88,13,3joint bestNash: W,W
Mutual contribution maximises joint welfare; withholding is each country’s dominant best response.
  1. If other contributes: 8>6 ⇒ withhold.
  2. If other withholds: 3>1 ⇒ withhold.
  3. Mutual withholding (3,3) = Nash equilibrium.
  4. Mutual contribution (6,6) is jointly preferred.
  5. An agreement must change payoff, information or expectation—not merely restate the desired outcome.
If the problem is…Mechanism
hidden defectionmonitoring + transparency
one-shot temptationrepetition + reciprocity
high contribution costfinance or technology transfer
reward to outsidersclub benefit / border measure
low ambitionreview and ratchet expectations

11b · Extended-matching discipline Course FAQ

Launch pad → prediction → option audit. A familiar topic word is not sufficient. Ask whether the option describes the right player, margin, baseline, causal channel and strength of conclusion.

Count required selections. Remove a partly true option if its unsupported clause makes the whole option false.

Agreement traps

  • Public good ≠ common resource: the examined mechanism is non-rival, difficult-to-exclude benefit and free-riding.
  • Nash ≠ socially best: it is stable against unilateral deviation, not necessarily efficient.
  • More signatories ≠ success: inspect ambition, implementation and behaviour.
  • Fairness word ≠ rule: turn capacity, responsibility or vulnerability into a contribution/finance mechanism.

Institution sentence stem: “This feature changes [information/current payoff/future payoff/distribution], reducing the private attraction of withholding and making reciprocal contribution more credible.”

12 · Drill 5: adaptation NPV Ch 10 worked example

Given: flood barrier costs $18m now; avoids expected losses of $4m at each year-end for six years; at 5%, annuity factor =5.076.

PV avoided loss$4m × 5.076 = $20.304mcost = $18mNPV= +$2.304mexcl. social effects
Positive financial NPV supports the project only within the simplified boundary.
  1. PV avoided loss = $4m×5.076=$20.304m.
  2. NPV = $20.304m−$18m=$2.304m.
  3. Then add maintenance, shifted flood/erosion risk, habitat/amenity, unequal protection and uncertainty.
  4. State residual and transferred risks; protection ≠ elimination.

Recommendation sentencePositive simplified NPV supports the barrier under stated assumptions; recommendation still depends on spillovers, non-market value, distribution, performance across plausible futures and a monitoring trigger.

12b · Policy-claim audit Ch 8 + Ch 9

boundarybaselinecausalityoutcomefinance / label ≠ impact
Outsourcing can lower reported direct emissions without lowering total relevant emissions; reconcile boundaries before celebrating a trend.
ClaimRequired evidence
credited reductioncounterfactual + additionality + verification
climate financeeligible assets + use tracking + independent review + outcomes
transition planinventory + interim target + capital decisions + accountability
positive project NPVfinancial case; climate case still needs baseline and emissions factors

Australian-policy judgement cards

Fixed rebate regardless of displaced emissions: objective/action mismatch and weak targeting. Scale support to independently estimated lifetime abatement; use declining rates or eligibility as costs fall; retain targeted finance where constraints are evidenced.

13 · If you see X → do Y All examinable chapters

Signal in stemImmediate move
hazard or temperature onlyinsert exposure → adaptation → valuation
MD>MACtighten; if MAC>MD, loosen
future flowPV = F/(1+r)ᵗ; r↑ ⇒ PV↓
probabilities disputedrobustness, learning, staging
public-good gamebest responses → Nash → joint welfare
six abatement unitsrank marginal units; stop at six
flat MB, uncertain steep MACprice; steep MB → quantity
policy name onlyentity, base, baseline, incentive, enforcement
credit/rebatecounterfactual, additionality, verification
protection projectavoided loss − cost; residual/shifted risk
predicttest exactcountremovecheckscope · mechanism · direction · qualifier
Extended matching rewards exact fit, not keyword recognition.

14 · Classic traps FAQ + practice

  • Modelled target presented as a physical threshold or certain fact.
  • Carbon shadow value confused with observed instrument price.
  • Uncertainty treated as zero effect or equal likelihood for all outcomes.
  • Agreement judged only by signatories or announcements.
  • Free permits treated as removing opportunity cost.
  • Additionality inferred from participation or certification.
  • Policy costs compared at different environmental outcomes.
  • Residual or transferred risk made to disappear.

15 · Exam-morning plan Course study strategy

1 · Closed notes. Rebuild from memory: G*, MD/MAC, PV, Ramsey, EV, MAC equalisation, price/quantity slope rule, adaptation NPV.

2 · Five oral chains. Damage; CBA; public-good game; policy mechanism; adaptation appraisal. For each: definition → rule → caveat.

3 · One clean drill each. Recompute 480 ppm, $5,522/$2,314, allocation cost 21 vs 31, Nash (3,3), adaptation NPV $2.304m.

4 · Option-set rehearsal. Predict before reading choices; reject overbroad clauses; count selections.

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