0 · Exam map Course + Week 13
“The final exam is a closed-book, fully invigilated eExam.” — ECC3640 Week 13 Exam page, Moodle 2026 (MD_Week_13_Exam.md)
Format: four extended-matching parts × five questions; each fully correct answer = 2 marks; 40 marks total. Predict the concept from the launch pad, test every option against its exact wording, count required selections, then remove unsupported extras.
| Priority | Final boundary |
|---|---|
| Rehearse hard | Every topic with a practice quiz except Science (week 2) and Stabilisation (week 7). |
| Use as context | Science and Stabilisation are foundations but excluded under the current notice. |
| Policy brief | Enterprise-driven decarbonisation has no weekly quiz and supports the brief. |
1 · Damage chain Ch 2 · examinable
Exposure = people/assets/ecosystems where hazard can affect them. Vulnerability = susceptibility, shaped by sensitivity and capacity to cope. Damage function maps a climate variable to economic loss under stated assumptions.
Audit: baseline and horizon? gross or post-adaptation? market plus non-market? population and price basis? thresholds? regional distribution? A dollar loss, percentage of output and mortality-risk change are not interchangeable.
Equal hazards need not mean equal welfare damage. Income, infrastructure, sector mix, population and adaptive capacity differ. Aggregate GDP can hide concentrated loss and values without market prices.
| Layer | What a good option says |
|---|---|
| Physical impact | health, ecosystem, infrastructure or production change before pricing |
| Market value | observable output/income effect, with boundary stated |
| Non-market value | health, biodiversity, amenity or culture valued by another method |
| Residual damage | harm left after adaptation; do not count avoided loss again |
2 · Climate CBA Ch 3 · core model
Policy variable: atmospheric concentration G. Total cost = climate damage + abatement cost. Tighter policy moves G toward reference G₀: damage falls, abatement cost rises.
Quadratic Quiggin frameworkDamage = kD(G − G₀)²
Abatement cost = kA(GBAU − G)²
MD = 2kD(G − G₀)
MAC = 2kA(GBAU − G)
Interior optimumMD = MAC
G* = (kA × GBAU + kD × G₀) ÷ (kA + kD)
P* = MD(G*) = MAC(G*)
| Change | Direction | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| kD ↑ | G* ↓ toward G₀ | extra concentration is costlier |
| kA ↑ | G* ↑ toward GBAU | tight control is costlier |
| discount rate ↑ | damage side tends ↓ | distant loss gets less present weight |
| omitted non-market loss added | damage side ↑ | boundary widens |
Check both margins and that G₀ ≤ G* ≤ GBAU. The model gives a calibrated shadow value, not an observed tax or permit price and not a physical threshold.
Assumptions carried by the result
Reference concentration fixes the damage anchor; business-as-usual concentration fixes the abatement anchor; kD and kA set curvature. Discounting, risk, non-market value and baseline growth affect the damage side. Technology and transition assumptions affect the abatement side.
Weighted-average intuition: G* sits between the two anchors. A larger coefficient gives its associated anchor more weight: larger kD weights G₀; larger kA weights GBAU. This is the fastest direction check.
Boundary case: equality identifies only an interior optimum. If MD and MAC do not cross inside the feasible interval, compare total cost at the relevant boundary rather than forcing the formula to describe an infeasible target.
3 · Time, risk, equity Ch 4 · core
Discrete present valuePV = Future amount ÷ (1 + r)ᵗ
Higher r or longer t → lower PV
Ramsey ruler = δ + ηg
δ = pure time preference
η = elasticity of marginal utility
g = consumption growth
Interpret: δ gives later utility less weight simply because it is later; ηg reflects diminishing marginal utility if future people are richer. Arithmetic is technical; parameter choice is empirical and ethical.
Risk is not deep uncertainty
Expected valueEV = Σ probability(state) × consequence(state)
Fat tail: enough probability on extremes that rare catastrophic loss can materially affect expected welfare, especially with irreversibility or limited adaptation. Do not infer “uncertainty = no action” or “uncertainty = maximal action”; match the rule to the uncertainty.
Robustness answer in four moves
- Identify states, probabilities or competing model structures.
- Show welfare under each, including an extreme-loss state where relevant.
- Ask whether the preferred action survives plausible alternatives.
- Use learning, staging or an adaptive trigger when revision has value.
Precaution is not a free conclusion. Explain asymmetry, irreversibility or fat-tail loss. Waiting is not free either: current damage, lock-in and lost options can accumulate while information improves.
4 · Cooperation game Ch 5 · examinable
Global public good: mitigation benefits are broadly non-rival and difficult to exclude. Efficient provision adds marginal benefits vertically across countries, while a government considering only domestic benefit tends to underprovide.
Free-riding: enjoy others’ mitigation while avoiding own cost. A prisoners’ dilemma can make mutual withholding individually stable even though mutual contribution is jointly better.
Solve any payoff table1 Against each action by the other, choose own higher payoff.
2 Intersection of best responses = Nash equilibrium.
3 Sum payoffs to find joint-welfare maximum.
4 Explain the gap; propose an institution that changes it.
| Design feature | Channel changed |
|---|---|
| Monitoring / transparency | information about performance |
| Repeated interaction / reciprocity | future payoff and expectations |
| Finance / transfers | current contribution cost + distribution |
| Club benefit / penalty | reward from withholding |
| Review cycle | learning and later ambition |
Equity principles: capacity, historical responsibility and vulnerability must become an operational contribution or finance rule.
Architecture evaluation
| Design | Trade-off |
|---|---|
| Broad participation | coverage improves; weak voluntary commitments may leave a collective-action gap |
| Stringent obligations | stronger commitments; harder to negotiate or enforce |
5 · Instrument chooser Ch 7 · core
Hold the environmental target constant. A policy may look cheap only because it covers fewer emissions or delivers less reduction. Under certainty, price and quantity can be calibrated to the same outcome.
| Instrument | Strength | Watch |
|---|---|---|
| Standard | direct performance/technology rule | may not equalise MAC; information burden |
| Tax | price certainty + revenue | emissions quantity adjusts |
| Subsidy | targets selected reductions | finance, additionality, expansion |
| ETS | quantity certainty + trade | price volatility, allocation, market power |
Cost effectivenessFor a fixed aggregate target, rank marginal abatement units lowest to highest. Flexible sources abate until MACᵢ = common tax or permit price. At the optimum: MAC₁ = MAC₂ = …, subject to monitoring and constraints.
Implementation gate: coverage · liable entity · measurement · baseline · enforcement · transaction cost · market power · revenue use · distribution. Hybrid designs can limit extreme price or quantity outcomes.
One-sentence instrument defences
6 · Policy mechanism audit Ch 8 · examinable
Start with the chain, not the programme name: objective → regulated/supported entity → emissions boundary → baseline → target → compliance unit → enforcement → behavioural response → measured outcome.
| Test | Memory sentence |
|---|---|
| Additionality | Would the claimed reduction occur without the incentive? |
| Baseline | Is the counterfactual inflated, unstable or manipulable? |
| Leakage | Did production/emissions move outside the boundary? |
| Distribution | Households, regions, competitiveness, revenue recycling. |
| Durability | Can investors plan long-lived low-emissions assets? |
Leakage risk ↑ when production is trade-exposed, emissions cost is material, relocation feasible and foreign production at least as emissions-intensive. Crediting integrity needs measurement, reporting and verification; participation alone never proves additionality.
7 · Adaptation decision Ch 10 · examinable
Mitigation changes future hazard; adaptation changes exposure, vulnerability or consequences. They are complements. Appraise: consistent horizon and prices → expected avoided damage → cost → residual risk → spillovers → non-market effects → distribution → robustness.
Adaptation valueAvoided damage = expected harm without measure − expected residual harm
NPV = PV(avoided damage) − present intervention cost