ECON60101 Chap.7 Walrasian Equilibrium and Welfare
Walrasian Equilibrium and Welfare
Walrasian Equilibrium and Welfare joins decentralised optimisation with aggregate market clearing. Scaling the complete price vector leaves excess demand unchanged, and Walras' law permits one price normalisation with only one fewer independent clearing equation. Existence relies on continuity, convexity and boundary conditions but does not guarantee uniqueness.
The first welfare theorem moves from equilibrium to Pareto efficiency. The second begins with an efficient allocation and, under convexity and redistribution conditions, finds supporting prices that decentralise it. Production economies add firms, ownership shares and net output feasibility.
What this chapter covers
- 01
Excess demand
- 02
Walras' law
- 03
Price normalisation
- 04
Equilibrium existence
- 05
First welfare theorem
- 06
Second welfare theorem
Worked example · free
Solve an excess-demand zero
- 2Set excess demand equal to zero: 8/p1-4=0.
- 2Solve p1=2; lower p1 produces positive excess demand and higher p1 produces excess supply.
- 1Use Walras' law to verify the second market once budgets balance.
Key terms
- Excess demand
- Excess demand is aggregate desired consumption minus aggregate available resources.
- Walras' law
- Walras' law makes the value of aggregate excess demand zero at every admissible price.
- Supporting price
- A supporting price separates an efficient allocation from feasible directions that would improve welfare.
Walrasian Equilibrium and Welfare FAQ
Why can one price be normalised?
Demand and excess demand are homogeneous of degree zero in the complete price vector, so multiplying every price by the same positive number changes no real budget set. Only relative prices determine allocations.
Does existence imply uniqueness?
No. A fixed-point argument can establish at least one Walrasian equilibrium while several price vectors or allocations still satisfy the equilibrium conditions. Uniqueness needs additional restrictions on excess demand or preferences.
How do the welfare theorems differ?
The first theorem begins with a competitive equilibrium and concludes Pareto efficiency under its assumptions. The second begins with a Pareto-efficient allocation and uses convexity plus suitable redistribution to support it as an equilibrium.
Exam move
Build equilibrium answers from individual problems outward. Derive each consumer's demand from preferences and endowment income and each firm's supply from profit maximisation when production is present. Aggregate the plans, normalise one price and solve the independent market-clearing equations. Verify the remaining market using Walras' law and distinguish a value identity from component-wise clearing.
For existence questions, list continuity, homogeneity, Walras' law and boundary behaviour, then explain why the argument secures at least one fixed point without proving uniqueness. Study the welfare theorems as arrows. Write first welfare theorem as equilibrium to efficiency and second welfare theorem as efficiency to support after redistribution under convexity.
Attach the working assumptions to each arrow and test scenarios with externalities, non-convex production or information failures to see where the conclusion breaks. In production economies, include ownership shares, profit income and aggregate endowment plus net output. Practise a two-good numerical excess-demand zero and a short theorem explanation in the same session.
Keep an error log for clearing only one market without a Walras-law check, confusing absolute and relative prices, reversing a theorem and equating Pareto efficiency with fairness. End every calculation with a price interpretation and every theorem with its exact welfare boundary. Draw an equilibrium pipeline whose boxes are households, firms, aggregation and market clearing.
Every arrow should name a variable: prices enter private problems, endowment values and profits generate incomes, individual choices become aggregate demands and supplies, and excess demand feeds back into the price search. Use this pipeline to diagnose incomplete solutions. If a proposed price appears without private optimisation or an aggregate equation, identify the missing link.
For a two-good economy, solve one clearing condition after fixing a numeraire, then calculate the other excess demand directly and relate the check to Walras' law. Do not claim that the law makes a disequilibrium market clear; it only creates dependence among value-weighted excess demands. Prepare theorem cards with three fields: direction, assumptions and conclusion.
The first welfare theorem starts from competitive equilibrium and reaches Pareto efficiency under conditions such as local nonsatiation and complete competitive markets. The second starts from a desired efficient allocation and asks whether prices can support it after suitable lump-sum redistribution, with convexity doing essential work.
Add counterexample cards for an externality, market power, missing contingent markets and a non-convex technology. On each card, specify the exact premise that breaks rather than saying vaguely that markets fail. For existence, trace how continuity, compactness or boundary conditions, homogeneity and Walras' law help construct a fixed-point argument; separate existence from uniqueness and stability.
A timed theorem answer should never substitute an efficiency slogan for the logical arrow. Finish by noting that Pareto efficiency is silent about distributive ranking: two efficient allocations can give radically different welfare distributions, and the second theorem's redistribution step is what separates allocation from support prices.
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