University College London · FACULTY OF ECONOMICS

BCPM0001 Chap.2 Transaction Costs, Institutions and the Firm

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Chapter 2 of 10 · BCPM0001

Transaction Costs, Institutions and the Firm

Transaction Costs, Institutions and the Firm explains why construction cannot be understood through supply and demand alone. Textbook price theory assumes exchange is free, yet every building project involves searching for partners, negotiating contracts, monitoring work on site and settling disputes.

Coase (1937) argued that firms exist because using the price mechanism has costs, and transaction cost economics, summarised by Tadelis and Williamson, compares governance forms by the costs they save for a given kind of transaction.

Construction occupies the middle ground between pure markets and pure hierarchy: main contractors manage networks of subcontractors they have used before, a pattern Eccles (1981) relates to craft administration in small, irregular markets.

The chapter adds institutional economics, with North on the rules of the game and Greif on the fundamental problem of exchange, to show why trust, reputation and formal rules change the cost of building. It closes by connecting fragmentation and consortia in the industry to weak investment in IT and research.

In this chapter

What this chapter covers

  • 01

    Why neoclassical price theory leaves out the cost of exchange

  • 02

    Coase and the boundary between market and firm

  • 03

    Transaction cost economics: asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency

  • 04

    Subcontract networks and craft administration

  • 05

    Institutions, trust and the fundamental problem of exchange

  • 06

    Make-or-buy decisions for specialist trades

Worked example · free

Place three ways of buying a trade on the governance spectrum

Q [6 marks]. A contractor can buy a specialist trade on a one-off spot contract, through a subcontractor it has used on many projects, or by employing the trade directly. Place each option on the spectrum from market to hierarchy, say what incentive intensity, administrative control and asset specificity look like at each point, and recommend one option for highly uncertain, lumpy workloads. The marks shown are an original practice allocation, not an official UCL marking scheme.
Governance forms run from spot market to in-house hierarchy.Governance forms run from spot market to in-house hierarchy. Moving right, incentive intensity falls while administrative control and asset specificity rise, so the subcontract network sits between the two poles.Spot marketSubcontract networkIn-house hierarchyIncentive intensity fallsAdministrative control risesAsset specificity rises
Governance forms run from spot market to in-house hierarchy. Moving right, incentive intensity falls while administrative control and asset specificity rise, so the subcontract network sits between the two poles.
  • 2Spot market: price coordinates the work, incentive intensity is strongest and administrative control is weakest; it suits standard tasks with little relationship-specific investment.
  • 2Subcontract network: repeat dealing adds reputation and some control while keeping prices and the freedom to buy only when a project needs the trade.
  • 1In-house hierarchy: control and asset specificity are highest, but incentives are weaker and the firm carries idle labour between jobs.
  • 1For uncertain, lumpy workloads the subcontract network usually economises best on total transaction costs.
The spot market sits at the left with strong incentives and weak control, the in-house trade at the right with strong control, high asset specificity and idle-time costs, and the subcontract network in between. Under uncertain, lumpy demand the network is usually the cheapest total arrangement. This allocation is not an official UCL scheme.
Sia tip — Name the attribute of the transaction, such as asset specificity or frequency, before recommending a governance form.
Glossary

Key terms

Asset specificity
The degree to which an investment loses value outside one particular relationship or project.
Craft administration
A way of running construction work in which skilled trades and subcontractors, rather than head-office managers, organise much of the work on site.
Opportunism
Self-interest pursued with guile, such as exploiting a partner after it has committed to a contract.
Institutions
Formal rules and informal norms that structure economic interaction, in North's sense of the rules of the game.
Hold-up
A situation in which one party uses another's sunk, specific investment to renegotiate terms in its favour.
FAQ

Transaction Costs, Institutions and the Firm FAQ

Why does Week 2 call neoclassical economics limited for construction?

Standard price theory assumes buyers and sellers can contract without cost. Construction projects are unique, long and uncertain, so searching for partners, writing incomplete contracts, supervising work and resolving claims all consume resources. Those costs shape how firms are organised, which simple supply and demand cannot explain.

What did Coase contribute to the economics of the firm?

Coase argued in 1937 that firms exist because using markets is costly. A firm grows until organising one more transaction inside it costs as much as buying it on the market. That comparison is the root of every make-or-buy question in contracting.

Why do main contractors subcontract so much work?

Demand for each trade is lumpy and moves from site to site, so employing every trade would mean paying for idle time. Subcontracting buys labour only when needed, while repeat dealing with familiar subcontractors keeps search and dispute costs lower than a pure spot market would.

How does trust lower the cost of building?

When parties expect each other to honour agreements, fewer resources go into detailed contracts, supervision and enforcement. The Pearce report notes that greater trust reduces the cost of entering contracts and exchanges. Reputation from repeat work is how the industry builds that trust.

Which reading should anchor a weekly response on this topic?

Coase (1937) is the essential starting point, with Tadelis and Williamson for the formal framework and Eccles (1981) for the construction application. Use one of them as evidence and add one observation about how subcontracting, tendering or disputes actually work in the industry.

Study strategy

Assessment move

Start by writing Coase's argument in three sentences from memory, then list the three attributes that transaction cost economics uses to compare governance forms. Practise one make-or-buy calculation that includes idle time, tendering, monitoring and dispute costs, and find the workload at which the answer changes.

Next, map real construction arrangements, such as spot tenders, framework subcontractors and directly employed trades, onto the market to hierarchy spectrum and explain each position. Read Eccles for how administration varies with market size and stability and Greif or North for institutions, noting one construction example for each. Finish with a 150-word response that links one reading to one visible feature of the industry.

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