ECNM10111: pass the exams, not just read the notes
Your complete guide to The University of Edinburgh's game theory module. See where the marks are, work real practice questions, and study with an AI tutor that knows ECNM10111.
Sia generates ECNM10111 practice questions, walks through strategic form games and nash equilibrium step by step, and quizzes you on the material the exam weights most heavily.
Worked example
Two players simultaneously choose Heads or Tails. Player 1 wins if the choices match, Player 2 wins if they differ; the winner gets 1 and the loser 0. What are the equilibria of this game?
Check for equilibria in pure strategies first. At any of the four outcomes one player is losing, and that player strictly prefers to switch, so no pure profile is stable.
Use the indifference condition. Player 1 must be made indifferent between Heads and Tails, which requires Player 2 to play each with probability one half; the same argument applied to Player 2 fixes Player 1's probabilities at one half.
So both randomising with probability one half is the unique equilibrium, and each player's expected payoff is one half.
The trap: Concluding that no equilibrium exists because no pure profile is stable. That is the answer this course exists to correct: mixing is not a hedge or an approximation, it is an equilibrium strategy in its own right, and in finite games one always exists. The second error is computing the mixing probabilities from your own payoffs rather than from the opponent's, since your mixture is what makes the opponent indifferent, not you. classic slip!
One exam decides 60% of your grade. Three hours, which is longer than any other economics paper in this guide. This whole page is built around that.
Overview
What ECNM10111 is, and where it sits
Game Theory is Edinburgh's rigorous introduction to the formal analysis of strategic interaction. The catalogue's framing is worth taking literally: game theory now pervades most non-elementary models in microeconomic theory and many models in other branches of economics and the social sciences, and this course exists to give you the analytical tools those models are built from.
The content covers static and sequential games with an emphasis on strategic reasoning, illustrated with examples and economic applications. Alongside the technique, the course states a second aim: to develop an abstract analysis of strategic thinking and to foster a critical and open-minded attitude toward game-theoretic concepts. In practice that means being asked not only to solve a game but to say what the solution concept assumes and where it fails.
The mathematical prerequisite is stated unusually plainly and should be read before enrolling. At a minimum you need to be comfortable with set and function notation, elementary linear algebra and calculus, and basic proof techniques such as mathematical induction. A basic understanding of more advanced linear algebra, calculus and topology in Euclidean spaces is described as useful. This is a formal course, not an applied one.
The assessment is entirely examined and split in two: a class exam worth 40% during the semester and a three-hour degree exam in December worth 60%. There is no coursework, which means there is also no opportunity to build a cushion outside the two papers.
Always treat your own course outline and the exam timetable as authoritative.
Difficulty & time commitment
Is ECNM10111 hard, and how much time does it take?
ECNM10111 is manageable if you keep a weekly rhythm and treat the back half as the main event. The pattern is consistent: it starts gently and steepens, and the heaviest assessment is the part that separates grades.
The difficulty curve and the assessment weighting point the same way: the back half is harder and worth more. Front-loading effort there is the highest-return decision in the module.
Is this module for you
Who tends to do well, and who tends to struggle
You will likely do well if
- You are comfortable with formal argument and proof, which the catalogue asks for directly.
- You want to know why a solution concept works rather than only how to apply it.
- You can work largely alone; 168 of the 200 hours are independent.
- You handle examined assessment well, since there is no coursework at all.
You may struggle if
- Your mathematics is applied rather than formal. Set notation and induction are assumed, not taught.
- You want an intuitive treatment of strategy. This is the rigorous version.
- You leave the class exam underprepared; at 40% it is larger than most in-semester papers.
- You rely on coursework marks. There are none.
- Write out the formal definition of each solution concept and then construct a game where it gives an unreasonable answer; the course explicitly asks for critical evaluation.
- Practise mixed strategy problems until the indifference logic is automatic, including which player's payoffs determine which player's probabilities.
- Prove one standard result per week by hand rather than reading the proof.
- For sequential games, always ask which threats are credible before applying backward induction mechanically.
Syllabus
The 8 topics, topic by topic
The exam-weight marker on each topic shows where the marks concentrate. The amber topics carry the highest exam weight.
T1 · Strategic form games and dominance
Static gamesRepresenting a strategic situation formally, then the first solution ideas: dominant strategies and iterated elimination of dominated ones.
T2 · Nash equilibrium
Static gamesThe central solution concept: a profile where no player gains by deviating alone. What it assumes is examined as closely as how to find it.
T3 · Mixed strategies
Static gamesRandomising over actions, why equilibrium can require it, and the indifference conditions that pin the probabilities down.
T4 · Sequential games and backward induction
Sequential gamesGames where timing matters, represented in extensive form and solved by working backwards from the end.
T5 · Subgame perfection and credibility
Sequential gamesRefining Nash equilibrium so that threats which would never be carried out do not count. The idea that makes commitment interesting.
T6 · Games of incomplete information
Sequential gamesStrategic interaction when players do not know each other's payoffs, and the equilibrium concepts that handle it.
T7 · Economic applications
ApplicationsThe formal machinery applied to economic problems, which is where the abstraction earns its keep.
T8 · Critical evaluation of solution concepts
ThroughoutA stated aim of the course rather than an afterthought: asking what each concept assumes about rationality and knowledge, and when those assumptions are unreasonable.
How it's assessed
Assessment structure
| Component | Weight | Format & timing |
|---|---|---|
| Degree exam | 60% | Written examination, 180 minutes, held in the December diet. December. Three hours, which is longer than any other economics paper in this guide. |
| Class exam | 40% | Class examination held during the semester. Semester 1. Unusually large for an in-semester paper, and the only mark available before the degree exam. |
- The published components sum to 100. No separate hurdle is published for this module. Note that the course is assessed entirely by examination, with no coursework component.
- Two papers, both written: a 40% class exam during the semester and a 180-minute degree exam in the December diet carrying 60%.
- Calculator policy: Not stated in the course catalogue entry.
This is an exam-cram module. With the exams at 60% of the grade and the degree exam alone at 60%, your result is overwhelmingly decided by how well you perform under time pressure. Three hours, which is longer than any other economics paper in this guide.
How to actually pass it
A weekly rhythm, two checklists, and the traps to avoid
The module rewards consistency over cramming, and practice over re-reading. Here is the loop that works, then what to have nailed before each exam.
The weekly loop
Before the mid-semester checklist
- Strategic form representation and dominance arguments
- Nash equilibrium, computed and defined
- Mixed strategies and the indifference conditions
- The assumptions about rationality and knowledge each concept requires
Before the final heaviest topics
- Extensive form games and backward induction
- Subgame perfection, and why credibility matters
- Games of incomplete information
- The economic applications covered in your year
- Critical evaluation of the concepts, which is a stated learning outcome
The mistakes that cost marks
Concluding no equilibrium exists because no pure one does. Finite games always have an equilibrium once mixing is allowed. Stopping at pure strategies is the most common error in the first half of the course.
Computing mixing probabilities from the wrong player's payoffs. Your mixture is chosen to make the opponent indifferent, not yourself. Getting this backwards produces a confident wrong answer.
Applying backward induction without checking credibility. The point of subgame perfection is that some Nash equilibria rely on threats no rational player would carry out.
Treating the critical evaluation aim as decoration. It is a stated learning outcome, and answers that only compute leave those marks on the table.
Teaching team
Who teaches ECNM10111
The bios below are factual. We do not rate lecturers; any star ratings are submitted by students who have taken ECNM10111.
Dr Ina Taneva
Listed as course organiser for Game Theory in the 2026/27 course catalogue for the School of Economics.
Teaching team as listed in the module materials reviewed. AskSia does not rate lecturers; star ratings are submitted by students who have taken ECNM10111.
Formula & concept sheet
The vocabulary and formulas you must own
- Strategic form
- A representation listing players, their available strategies and their payoffs.
- Dominant strategy
- A strategy that is best regardless of what the others do.
- Iterated elimination
- Removing dominated strategies in sequence to simplify a game.
- Nash equilibrium
- A strategy profile in which no player can gain by deviating alone.
- Mixed strategy
- A probability distribution over actions; in equilibrium it makes the opponent indifferent.
- Extensive form
- A representation of a game as a tree, capturing the order of moves and what each player knows.
- Backward induction
- Solving a sequential game from the final decisions backwards.
- Subgame perfect equilibrium
- A refinement requiring equilibrium play in every subgame, ruling out incredible threats.
- Credible threat
- A threatened action that the threatening player would actually want to carry out if called upon.
- Incomplete information
- A setting where players do not know others' payoffs, handled with beliefs and types.
- Common knowledge
- A fact known to all, known by all to be known, and so on; an assumption many solution concepts quietly require.
Common acronyms: {'term': 'SCQF', 'def': 'Scottish Credit and Qualifications Framework'} · {'term': 'ECTS', 'def': 'European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System'} · {'term': 'DRPS', 'def': "Degree Regulations and Programmes of Study, the university's course catalogue"}.
Set texts
The prescribed reading
The syllabus references map straight onto these.
Game Theory: An Introduction
Steven Tadelis (2013).
Game Theory for Applied Economists
Robert Gibbons (1992).
An Introduction to Game Theory
Martin J. Osborne (2003).
Where it fits
Prerequisites, related modules & why it matters
Students must have passed Economics 1A and Economics 1B, or Economics 1, and one of Statistical Methods for Economics, the mathematics department's Probability and Statistics options, or Data Analysis for Psychology in R 2. Visiting students need at least four semester-long economics courses at grade B or above, including intermediate macroeconomics and microeconomics with calculus, probability and statistics, and introductory econometrics.
Your ECNM10111 study toolkit
Study the module with Sia, not just read about it
Each tool already knows ECNM10111: your syllabus, your texts, and where the marks are. Grouped by how you study, from first contact to exam week.
FAQ
Frequently asked questions
How is Game Theory assessed?
Entirely by examination: a class exam worth 40% during the semester and a 180-minute degree exam in the December diet worth 60%. There is no coursework.
How much mathematics do I need?
More than most Honours options. The catalogue asks for familiarity with set and function notation, elementary linear algebra and calculus, and basic proof techniques such as mathematical induction, and describes more advanced linear algebra, calculus and topology in Euclidean spaces as useful.
What are the prerequisites?
Economics 1A and Economics 1B, or Economics 1, plus one of Statistical Methods for Economics, the mathematics department's probability and statistics options, or Data Analysis for Psychology in R 2.
What is the textbook?
Tadelis, Game Theory: An Introduction, as the main text, with Gibbons' Game Theory for Applied Economists and Osborne's An Introduction to Game Theory as additional resources.
Is it applied or theoretical?
Theoretical, with economic applications used as illustration. The catalogue states most of the content relies on mathematical and formal reasoning.
How much contact time is there?
Twenty lecture hours and eight tutorial hours out of a published total of 200, so 168 hours are directed and independent learning. This is a course that runs on the work you do outside class.
Study ECNM10111 with Sia
Work through strategic form games, nash equilibrium, mixed strategies and the rest of the module with a tutor that knows it and quizzes you on the topics the assessments weight most heavily.
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