ECON1001 Chap.7 Game Theory & Oligopoly
Game Theory & Oligopoly
Oligopoly makes strategic interdependence unavoidable: each firm's best action depends on what rivals do. Game theory organises that reasoning with players, strategies, payoffs, best responses, dominant strategies, and Nash equilibrium. This chapter solves simultaneous-move payoff matrices and uses the prisoners' dilemma to explain why individually rational choices can produce a poor joint result.
It then connects repeated interaction, punishment, and antitrust limits to collusion. A stable outcome need not maximise combined payoff, and an attractive joint outcome need not be stable. The analysis therefore separates prediction from evaluation and treats every payoff as belonging to a named player in a stated order.
Best-response curves extend that conditional-choice logic from a small matrix to continuous output decisions by competing firms.
What this chapter covers
- 01
Oligopoly and strategic interdependence
- 02
Players, strategies, payoffs, and common knowledge
- 03
Best responses and dominant strategies
- 04
Nash equilibrium and the prisoners' dilemma
- 05
Repeated games, collusion, and incentives to cheat
Worked example · free
Find best responses and Nash equilibrium
- +1If firm B chooses Hold, firm A prefers Cut because 9 exceeds 6.
- +1If B chooses Cut, A still prefers Cut because 3 exceeds 1.
- +2By symmetry, B prefers Cut whether A chooses Hold or Cut.
- +2Cut is dominant for both firms, so Cut/Cut is the Nash equilibrium.
- +1Hold/Hold gives both 6 and is jointly better, showing a prisoners' dilemma.
Key terms
- Oligopoly
- A market dominated by a small number of strategically interdependent firms.
- Best response
- A strategy that gives a player the highest payoff given the other player's chosen strategy.
- Dominant strategy
- A strategy that is a best response to every possible strategy of the other player.
- Nash equilibrium
- A strategy profile in which no player can gain by changing strategy alone.
- Prisoners' dilemma
- A game where dominant individual choices create an equilibrium worse for all than another feasible outcome.
Game Theory & Oligopoly FAQ
Is every Nash equilibrium based on dominant strategies?
No. A dominant-strategy equilibrium is a special case because each player's choice is best against every rival action. Nash equilibrium only requires each choice to be best against the action actually chosen by others. A game can therefore have one or several Nash equilibria even when no player has a dominant strategy.
Why is a jointly better outcome not automatically an equilibrium?
An outcome may maximise combined payoffs yet give each player an incentive to deviate alone. Nash equilibrium tests unilateral incentives, not fairness or total payoff. In a prisoners' dilemma, cooperation is jointly better, but each player expects a higher individual payoff from defection regardless of the other's action.
How can repeated interaction support cooperation?
When firms expect to meet again, cheating today can trigger lower future payoffs through retaliation. Cooperation becomes easier when future profits matter, actions are observable, punishment is credible, and the game is not known to end immediately. This economic logic does not make explicit collusion lawful; competition rules still apply.
What should be done when a player has tied best responses?
Mark both responses rather than forcing a unique choice. A tie means either action maximises that player's payoff against the stated rival action. Nash equilibria are still the cells where every player's selected action is among their best responses, so ties can create multiple equilibrium candidates.
Exam move
Solve matrices mechanically before interpreting them. For the row player, compare payoffs down each column; for the column player, compare payoffs across each row. Mark every best response, then find cells where markings coincide. Only after locating equilibrium should you discuss efficiency, cooperation, or collusion.
Redraw matrices from prose and state whether your conclusion depends on simultaneity, repetition, observability, or a credible punishment strategy. Begin each matrix by writing the payoff order, such as row player first and column player second. Cover the rival's coordinate while comparing one player's choices, preserving ties instead of inventing a strict ranking.
After marking mutual best responses, test each candidate with a unilateral-deviation sentence: hold the rival fixed and ask whether moving alone improves payoff. Next compare equilibrium payoffs with the largest joint payoff and explain why a Pareto-superior cell may remain unstable. For oligopoly applications, identify what each strategy means in market terms, such as output, price, advertising, or quota compliance.
Repeated-game answers should name the information and timing assumptions that make punishment possible. Keep legal evaluation separate from equilibrium prediction: an economic mechanism that could support coordination does not turn explicit collusion into lawful conduct.
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