King's College London · S1 2026 · FACULTY OF ECONOMICS

7QQMM200 Microeconomics

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The Complete Exam Bible · Semester 1 2026/27

7QQMM200 Overview

Microeconomics
— Solve constrained choices, then test strategic credibility.
  • King's College London
  • Semester 1 2026/27
  • Postgraduate
  • In-person examinations

What this module asks you to do

Microeconomics turns choices and strategic interaction into precise models. The consumer-theory half begins with feasible consumption bundles, relative prices and opportunity cost. It then adds preference rankings, indifference curves and utility representations before solving constrained choice.

  • Start with feasibility A budget set identifies affordable bundles before preferences select among them.
  • Test solution type Tangency, corner and kink solutions require different conditions.
  • Strategies are complete plans Dynamic-game answers include actions at information sets that are not reached.
  • Refine off path Subgame perfection rejects Nash profiles supported by locally inferior threats.
7QQMM200 · King's College London
An independent, AskSia-authored study guide. AskSia is not affiliated with, endorsed by, or sponsored by King's College London; the course code and name are used for identification only.
Assessment

How 7QQMM200 is assessed

ComponentWeightFormat
In-Person Midterm Examination20%1-hour in-person examination
In-Person Final Examination80%2-hour in-person examination in January 2027

The weights and examination durations come from the 2026/27 KEATS assessment page. Confirm live scheduling details in KEATS because two university files disagree on the midterm date and time.

Assessment structure

20%80%MidtermFinal

Segment widths reproduce the two published weights and total 100%.

Contents · every chapter, one map

What 7QQMM200 covers

Eight chapters move from feasible consumer choices to utility maximisation and dynamic-game refinements.

01

Budget Sets and Opportunity Cost

Build feasible sets, relative-price slopes and piecewise boundaries

Feasibility before choice

A budget set contains every bundle whose expenditure does not exceed income. Its boundary contains bundles that spend the full amount.

  • Consumption choice set
  • Budget inequality
  • Relative-price slope
  • Income shift
  • Price pivot
  • Piecewise pricing
02

Preferences and Indifference Curves

Use ranking axioms, curve geometry, convexity and local trade-offs

Rankings in symbols and pictures

Preference relations compare bundles without assigning meaningful distances between them.

  • Weak preference
  • Transitivity
  • Monotonicity
  • Indifference map
  • Marginal rate of substitution
  • Convex mixtures
03

Utility Representations and Special Preferences

Separate ordinal representation from substitute and complement shapes

Numbers that preserve rankings

A utility function represents preferences when its numerical order matches the preference order for every pair of alternatives.

  • Ordinal utility
  • Increasing transformation
  • Continuous representation
  • Perfect substitutes
  • Perfect complements
  • Cobb-Douglas shape
04

Consumer Choice and Tangency

Solve interior optima while checking corner and kink boundaries

Choose the best feasible bundle

Consumer optimisation combines affordability with preference ranking. Under monotonicity, a smooth interior optimum exhausts income and places the indifference-curve slope against the budget slope.

  • Affordable optimum
  • Budget exhaustion
  • Tangency
  • Marginal utility per pound
  • Corner solution
  • Kink solution
05

Lagrange Demand and Boundary Solutions

Derive Cobb-Douglas demand and verify expenditure shares

Optimisation as a system

The Lagrangian combines utility with the binding budget. Dividing the quantity first-order conditions removes the multiplier, and the remaining relation joins the budget to produce Marshallian demands.

  • Lagrangian
  • First-order condition
  • Demand function
  • Expenditure share
  • Comparative statics
  • Boundary check
06

Game Trees, Information Sets and Strategies

Translate timing, observation and actions into complete plans

Represent strategic timing

An extensive-form game records players, actions, move order, information, terminal outcomes and any moves by Nature.

  • Root node
  • Terminal node
  • Ordered payoff
  • Information set
  • Perfect information
  • Contingent strategy
07

Backward Induction and Credible Play

Solve continuation choices and expose non-credible threats

Solve continuations first

Backward induction selects optimal actions at the final decision nodes, carries their payoffs to earlier nodes and repeats until the root is solved.

  • Continuation payoff
  • Sequential rationality
  • Backward induction
  • Equilibrium path
  • Off-path action
  • Credible threat
08

Subgames and Subgame Perfection

Test Nash profiles in every proper continuation game

Identify valid continuation games

A subgame begins at a singleton information set, includes every successor and never cuts through an information set.

  • Subgame root
  • Proper subgame
  • Information-set boundary
  • Nash restriction
  • Off-path best response
  • SPNE refinement

The central discipline is to distinguish the object being modelled from the numerical or graphical tool used to represent it.

From geometry to optimisation

Budget lines show what can be bought, while preferences determine which affordable bundle is best. Smooth interior choices join a budget equation to a tangency condition.

Special preferences alter that method: perfect substitutes can lead to a corner, and perfect complements are chosen at a kink. Lagrange multipliers provide a systematic route to Cobb-Douglas demand, but the final bundle still needs a feasibility and boundary check.

From actions to strategies

The dynamic-games half makes timing and information explicit.

A game tree records move order, action sets, information sets and terminal payoffs. A strategy is a complete contingent plan, not only the action observed on the equilibrium path.

Backward induction solves finite perfect-information games by optimising from later nodes toward the root.

Why refinements matter

Nash equilibrium can be supported by off-path behaviour that would not be optimal if the relevant node were reached. Sequential rationality and subgame perfection test those continuation incentives.

This is why a complete equilibrium answer states the full strategy profile, identifies proper subgames and checks local best responses rather than reporting only one terminal outcome.

How the assessment is structured

The published module assessment consists of a 20% in-person midterm examination and an 80% in-person final examination. The final is two hours and takes place in the January 2027 assessment period.

The university material does not publish final-paper sections or question counts, so preparation should focus on transferable set-up, calculation and interpretation.

Worked example · free

Solve and verify a consumer optimum

Q [8 marks]. AskSia-authored practice. Utility is u(x1,x2) = x1^(1/2)x2^(1/2), prices are £3 and £2, and income is £120. Find the interior bundle and verify both expenditure and tangency. The marks shown are an AskSia study allocation, not an official King's marking scheme.
The interior candidate uses two conditions at once.The interior candidate uses two conditions at once. The chosen point lies on the budget boundary where the indifference curve has the same slope. (20,30)20303x1 + 2x2 = 120u = √(x1x2)
The interior candidate uses two conditions at once. The chosen point lies on the budget boundary where the indifference curve has the same slope.
  • 2Use equal exponents to allocate equal spending shares.
  • 3Convert £60 per good into quantities 20 and 30.
  • 3Verify the budget and price-ratio condition.
Equal exponents allocate £60 to each good. Therefore x1 = 20 and x2 = 30. Expenditure is 3(20) + 2(30) = 120, while MU1/MU2 = x2/x1 = 30/20 = 3/2, matching the price ratio.
Sia tip — Check the original budget after solving; a neat tangency with the wrong expenditure is not feasible.
Glossary

Key terms

Budget Set
The Budget Set contains every non-negative bundle whose total expenditure does not exceed income.
Budget Line
The Budget Line is the boundary containing bundles that exhaust income.
Opportunity Cost
Opportunity Cost measures the amount of one good surrendered to obtain more of another.
Preference Relation
A Preference Relation ranks alternatives as better, worse or equally good.
Indifference Curve
An Indifference Curve contains bundles that receive the same preference ranking.
Marginal Utility
Marginal Utility is the change in utility from a small increase in one good.
Tangency Condition
The Tangency Condition equates the consumer's local trade-off with the market price ratio at a smooth interior optimum.
Corner Solution
A Corner Solution places the optimum on an axis because all spending goes to one good.
Information Set
An Information Set groups decision nodes that a player cannot distinguish when choosing an action.
Pure Strategy
A Pure Strategy specifies one action at every information set belonging to a player.
Backward Induction
Backward Induction solves later decisions first and carries their continuation values toward the root.
Subgame Perfection
Subgame Perfection requires a strategy profile to be a Nash equilibrium in every proper subgame.
FAQ

7QQMM200 FAQ

How should I start a budget-line question?

Write the affordability inequality, then the equality for the boundary. Calculate both intercepts and the negative relative-price slope before describing a shift or pivot. This order exposes inverted price ratios early and keeps claims about feasible choices separate from claims about what a consumer prefers.

Why can two utility functions represent the same preferences?

Utility is ordinal in this module: it preserves rankings rather than measuring satisfaction in fixed units. Any strictly increasing transformation keeps every better-than and indifference comparison unchanged, even though the printed utility levels and gaps look different.

When is the tangency condition inappropriate?

Tangency is designed for a smooth interior optimum. Perfect substitutes can produce a corner, perfect complements are chosen at a kink, and any candidate outside the feasible set must be rejected. Classify the preference shape and check boundaries before relying on first-order conditions.

What does a Lagrange multiplier calculation need to show?

Show the objective, the binding budget, the first-order conditions and the algebra that links marginal utilities to prices. Then substitute the proposed bundle into the original budget. For Cobb-Douglas preferences, expenditure shares provide a fast independent check on the result.

Why is an action not the same as a strategy?

An action describes one move at one information set. A pure strategy is a complete contingent plan that assigns an action at every information set belonging to the player, including sets that the equilibrium path never reaches.

What is published about the final examination?

The KEATS assessment page states that the final is an in-person examination worth 80%, lasts two hours and takes place in January 2027. It also requires an approved calculator. The available material does not publish the paper's section layout or question count.

How does subgame perfection differ from Nash equilibrium?

Subgame perfection adds continuation discipline. The strategy profile must induce a Nash equilibrium in every proper subgame, including those off the realised path. This rejects Nash profiles that depend on threats a player would not carry out when called to move.

Chapter questions

Questions students ask in each 7QQMM200 chapter

What makes a bundle just affordable?
A bundle is just affordable when its expenditure equals income. It lies on the budget line rather than strictly inside the budget set, where some income would remain unspent. Chapter 01 · Budget Sets and Opportunity Cost
What information do preferences contain?
Preferences identify whether one bundle is better, worse or equally good compared with another. They do not reveal a numerical amount by which one option is preferred. Chapter 02 · Preferences and Indifference Curves
Do higher utility gaps mean stronger preference?
No. The representation only guarantees ordering. A strictly increasing transformation can change every numerical gap while leaving the underlying preference relation and all choices exactly the same. Chapter 03 · Utility Representations and Special Preferences
What two equations determine a smooth interior choice?
Use the binding budget equation together with the equality between the marginal rate of substitution and the relative price. One equation alone leaves the quantities underdetermined. Chapter 04 · Consumer Choice and Tangency
Why divide the first-order conditions?
The division cancels the common multiplier and utility terms, producing a clean relationship between quantities, preference exponents and prices that can be combined with the budget. Chapter 05 · Lagrange Demand and Boundary Solutions
What must an extensive-form description include?
It needs the players, payoff functions, order of moves, available actions, information at each decision and any probability distribution governing moves by Nature within the model. Chapter 06 · Game Trees, Information Sets and Strategies
What is the order of a backward-induction solution?
Start at the latest decision nodes, select each mover's best action, replace the node with its continuation payoff and work carefully toward the initial choice. Chapter 07 · Backward Induction and Credible Play
Can a subgame start at a terminal node?
No. A terminal node contains no remaining decision and therefore cannot root a continuation game. The subgame must begin at a decision node with successors. Chapter 08 · Subgames and Subgame Perfection
Study strategy

How to study for the exam

Start each revision session with one representation task and one solution task. For consumer theory, sketch the feasible set, label intercepts, classify the preference shape and only then choose tangency, a corner comparison or a kink condition. Recompute expenditure at the end. For dynamic games, list players, actions, information sets and terminal payoffs before writing complete strategies.

Solve later moves first when information is perfect, but stop if the mover cannot identify the current node. Finish by testing off-path incentives in every proper subgame. Keep an error log organised by direction mistakes, boundary mistakes and incomplete strategies. On the next day, redo only the first failed step before attempting a new problem.

In the final week, alternate short calculations with verbal explanations so that every formula is paired with an economic interpretation and every equilibrium claim names the local best-response condition that supports it.

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