King's College London · FACULTY OF ECONOMICS

7QQMM200 Chap.8 Subgames and Subgame Perfection

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Chapter 8 of 8 · 7QQMM200

Subgames and Subgame Perfection

Identify valid continuation games

A subgame begins at a singleton information set, includes every successor and never cuts through an information set. The whole game is a subgame, while proper subgames exclude the whole game.

Refine Nash equilibrium

Subgame perfection requires a Nash equilibrium in every proper continuation, including those outside the realised path.

It removes profiles sustained by locally inferior threats. Finite perfect-information games can be solved by backward induction, while imperfect-information subgames require their appropriate equilibrium analysis.

Draw valid continuation boundaries

A subgame root must be a decision node that stands alone in its information set.

Include every later node and branch, and preserve inherited payoffs and information links. A boundary that slices through an information set is invalid because it grants the continuation players information different from the original game.

A terminal node cannot root a subgame because no strategic choice remains.

Restrict one full profile

Take the candidate strategy profile and keep the components relevant inside a chosen subgame. Test whether each player is best responding within that continuation. Do not redesign action sets or select a more convenient payoff.

The restriction must describe how the original candidate would behave if that continuation were reached.

Use the smallest failure first

Begin with the latest or smallest proper subgames. One profitable deviation is sufficient to reject the candidate as subgame perfect, even when the failed continuation lies off path. A surviving profile moves outward through larger continuations and finally the whole game.

This order keeps the reason for rejection visible and avoids unnecessary calculations.

Allow multiple refined profiles when justified

A proper subgame may have several Nash equilibria. Each continuation selection can generate a different payoff at an earlier node and therefore a different root action. Several SPNE can consequently survive without contradiction.

Report complete profiles and outcomes separately, and avoid selecting one unless the problem supplies a refinement or coordination rule beyond subgame perfection.

Apply a three-part boundary test

For every proposed subgame, check its root, descendants and information sets.

The root must be alone in its information set; all successors of the root must be included; and no information set may be partly inside and partly outside the boundary. Passing only the first test is insufficient.

In games with linked nodes, a visually natural continuation can fail the third condition because starting there would reveal which linked history occurred.

Separate refinement from equilibrium discovery

Subgame perfection does not ask whether one action looks credible in isolation. It asks whether the restriction of one complete strategy profile forms a Nash equilibrium in every valid subgame.

Start with candidate profiles, test the smallest continuations, and reject a candidate at the first profitable deviation. If no proper subgame exists, the refinement adds no restriction beyond Nash equilibrium. If several continuation equilibria exist, carry each consistent selection outward rather than assuming refinement creates uniqueness.

In this chapter

What this chapter covers

  • 01

    Subgame root

  • 02

    Proper subgame

  • 03

    Information-set boundary

  • 04

    Nash restriction

  • 05

    Off-path best response

  • 06

    SPNE refinement

Worked example · free

Apply the refinement filter

Q [7 marks]. A candidate Nash profile prescribes an off-path action yielding payoff 1 when another available action yields 5 in that proper subgame. Decide whether the profile is SPNE. The marks shown are an AskSia study allocation, not an official King's marking scheme.
Subgame perfection is a refinement filter.Subgame perfection is a refinement filter. Begin with Nash profiles, test their restrictions in every proper subgame, and retain only those that pass all continuation games. Nash profilesevery subgameSPNE
Subgame perfection is a refinement filter. Begin with Nash profiles, test their restrictions in every proper subgame, and retain only those that pass all continuation games.
  • 2Identify the relevant proper subgame.
  • 2Compare the mover's two continuation payoffs.
  • 3Reject the profile because its restriction is not Nash.
The profile is not subgame perfect. In the proper subgame, the mover can deviate from payoff 1 to payoff 5, so the restricted strategy profile fails the Nash equilibrium condition.
Sia tip — One profitable deviation in one proper subgame is enough to reject a candidate SPNE.
Glossary

Key terms

Subgame
A Subgame is a continuation tree rooted at a singleton information set and closed under successors.
Proper Subgame
A Proper Subgame is a subgame that does not include the whole game.
SPNE
SPNE is a strategy profile that induces Nash equilibrium in every proper subgame.
FAQ

Subgames and Subgame Perfection FAQ

Can a subgame start at a terminal node?

No. A terminal node contains no remaining decision and therefore cannot root a continuation game. The subgame must begin at a decision node with successors.

Why can a subgame not cut an information set?

Doing so would change what a player knows by including some indistinguishable nodes but excluding others. A valid continuation must inherit the original game's information structure.

Can a game have several SPNE?

Yes. If a proper continuation has multiple Nash equilibria, different continuation selections can create different incentives at earlier nodes and support several subgame-perfect strategy profiles.

Study strategy

Exam move

Circle every singleton decision node and test whether its successor region contains complete information sets. Work from the smallest proper subgames outward, reject a candidate immediately after finding a profitable deviation, and report the full surviving strategies.

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