EE535 Chap.10 Risk, Criticality and RCM Decisions
Risk, Criticality and RCM Decisions
Risk links evidence to a required response
Risk-based asset management focuses attention by considering consequence and occurrence evidence while balancing safety, service, performance, cost and organisational responsibilities. A risk label becomes useful when it changes the required response.
The captured case defines R1 through R4 actions, from required reduction except in exceptional circumstances to acceptable risk. Use those secure definitions rather than reconstructing numerical boundaries from an unreadable matrix.
ALARP is a proportionality judgement
R2 and R3 sit in the region where further risk reduction is considered against reasonable practicability or cost effectiveness.
The analysis needs available controls, technical feasibility, cost, operational effect and expected improvement. It is not enough to say that current risk is tolerable or that a control is expensive.
The recommendation should show why further effort is required, proportionate or not justified under the relevant response statement.
Service criticality is related but separate
Service criticality highlights customer disruption, operational sensitivity, revenue, public attention and complaint consequences.
A low-cost component can be highly critical when its failure removes an important service or requires scarce restoration capability. Safety risk and service criticality may reinforce each other or point in different directions.
Name both and state how each affects priority, spares, inspection, contingency, renewal or management attention.
RCM starts with required function
Reliability-centred maintenance defines required function and performance, identifies functional failures and credible failure modes, examines local and wider consequences, and selects technically applicable and worthwhile actions.
A task may be scheduled, condition-based, failure-finding, corrective, redesign or another controlled response depending on evidence and consequence.
The method does not require inventing a precise probability where the work history is weak; improving information can be the first decision.
Selective change and assurance matter
The captured railway case reviewed overhaul tasks using safety consequence and probability, service criticality, failure history, characteristics, detection and condition.
The overall cycle moved from 3.25 to four years and most tasks followed a 4-8-12 pattern, while selected safety- or reliability-critical tasks were shortened. Cost-benefit, reliability and safety review, approval, trials and validation supported implementation. The lesson is selective task review, not blanket interval extension.
What this chapter covers
- 01
Risk evidence and response categories R1 to R4
- 02
ALARP and proportional risk reduction
- 03
Service criticality C1 to C4
- 04
Value, priority and non-negotiable boundaries
- 05
Function, functional failure and failure mode
- 06
Technically applicable and worthwhile maintenance tasks
- 07
Selective interval change, trials and validation
Worked example · free
Separate service criticality from safety risk
- 3Separate the two consequence views.
- 4Identify evidence and options.
- 3State assurance and review.
Key terms
- Risk
- The effect of uncertainty considered through consequence, occurrence evidence and organisational objectives.
- ALARP
- A proportionality region in which further reduction is judged against reasonable practicability or cost effectiveness.
- Service Criticality
- The importance of an asset or failure to customer service and related organisational consequences.
- Functional Failure
- The inability of an asset to meet a required function or performance standard.
- Failure Mode
- The specific event or mechanism by which a functional failure occurs.
- RCM
- A method for selecting maintenance from functions, failures, consequences, evidence and applicable controls.
Risk, Criticality and RCM Decisions FAQ
What action belongs to each captured risk class?
R1 must be reduced except in exceptional circumstances. R2 must be reduced if reasonably practicable. R3 is tolerable but should be reduced when doing so is cost-effective. R4 is acceptable. R2 and R3 occupy the proportionality region described in the case.
Is service criticality the same as risk?
No. Service criticality focuses customer and operational sensitivity, while a risk assessment can address safety and other consequence dimensions with occurrence evidence and treatment rules. They may align, but using them separately prevents a high-profile disruption from being mistaken automatically for the highest safety category.
Does the captured RCM case justify extending all intervals?
No. The case changed the overall cycle and extended many tasks, but shortened selected safety- or reliability-critical tasks. It also used review, approval, trials and validation. The transferable method is task-by-task evidence and assurance, not general extension based on one historical success.
Exam move
For one failure, write the consequence evidence and occurrence evidence separately, then apply only the secure R1 to R4 response language. Add service criticality as a second line and state which decision each view changes. Continue with function, functional failure, failure mode, consequence and applicable task. Where evidence is weak, write the information improvement needed instead of inventing probability.
Finish with assurance, trial or review steps and list any critical tasks that do not follow a new overall interval. This protects proportionality and selective reasoning.
Working through Risk, Criticality and RCM Decisions in EE535? Sia is AskSia’s AI Electrical Engineering tutor — ask any EE535 Risk, Criticality and RCM Decisions question and get a clear, step-by-step explanation grounded in how EE535 is taught and assessed. Read this chapter free, then take your hardest questions to Sia.