PMGM7004 Chap.6 Price Discrimination and Segmentation
Price Discrimination and Segmentation
Sorting mechanism comes before pricing formula
Price discrimination requires market power, a way to sort buyers and limits on resale. First-degree discrimination targets individual willingness to pay, second-degree discrimination uses a menu that induces self-selection, and third-degree discrimination assigns observable groups to separate demand curves.
The firm applies marginal revenue equals marginal cost within each valid segment and charges a larger price-cost gap where residual demand responds less strongly. A ban on segmentation creates a pooled demand curve and can change total output, access and surplus as well as prices.
Distinguish sorting from ordinary cost recovery
Different posted prices are not enough to establish discrimination.
Compare like products after accounting for genuine differences in delivery, timing or service cost. Then identify whether the seller observes a group, offers a self-selecting menu or attempts to price individual units by willingness to pay.
The classification should name who performs the sorting and what prevents a low-price buyer from transferring the offer to a high-price buyer.
Solve only segments that can remain separate
Write an inverse demand relationship for each valid segment, derive its marginal revenue and equate it with the applicable marginal cost. Recover each price from its own demand curve and then recombine quantities.
Elasticity helps explain the resulting price gaps, but only at the chosen points on the firm's residual demands. If resale, mistaken classification or easy package switching joins the groups, replace the separate calculations with a pooled problem.
Report access, distribution and efficiency separately
Segmentation can lower one price, raise another and either expand or contract total output.
A low-value group may gain access under a targeted offer, while another group transfers more surplus to the firm. Compare the segmented quantities with the best uniform-price outcome before judging efficiency. Then identify how buyer surplus and producer surplus move by group. This ending prevents a fairness claim from being inferred solely from whether one posted price is higher.
What this chapter covers
- 01
Feasibility conditions
- 02
First-degree pricing
- 03
Second-degree self-selection
- 04
Third-degree segmentation
- 05
Inverse-elasticity pricing
- 06
Pooled demand and access
Worked example · free
Price two separated markets
- 3Derive and solve Segment A marginal revenue.
- 3Derive and solve Segment B marginal revenue.
- 4Interpret the price difference and separation condition.
Key terms
- First-degree Discrimination
- Pricing each unit at an individual buyer's willingness to pay.
- Second-degree Discrimination
- A menu that induces buyers to reveal type through self-selection.
- Third-degree Discrimination
- Separate prices assigned to observable groups with distinct demand curves.
- Arbitrage
- Resale from a low-price buyer to a high-price buyer that erodes a price difference.
- Incentive Compatibility
- A menu property under which each buyer type prefers the package intended for it.
Price Discrimination and Segmentation FAQ
Are all price differences price discrimination?
No. Different production, delivery or service costs can justify different prices for the same broad product. Temporary experiments and inventory clearance can also explain a gap. The discrimination test compares effective prices after relevant cost differences and then asks whether market power, sorting and limited resale make the difference sustainable.
Why can perfect price discrimination be efficient?
The seller continues serving units until willingness to pay equals marginal cost, so output reaches the competitive quantity and no mutually beneficial trade is excluded. The result is distributionally extreme because the seller captures the surplus buyers would otherwise retain. Efficiency and distribution must therefore be reported separately.
Can banning segmentation hurt a low-value group?
Yes. A pooled uniform price can sit above that group's willingness to pay, removing access even if its discriminatory price had been low. The ban can also lower the price paid by a high-value group. Welfare depends on total output and who enters or leaves, not simply on whether the posted prices become equal.
Exam move
Take six real pricing practices and classify who does the sorting: the seller, the buyer or the data. For each, test market power, separation and resale. Then solve two-segment linear examples with separate marginal revenues and compare them with a pooled uniform-price calculation. End each answer by reporting total output, access and the distribution of surplus rather than profit alone.
Add one failed segmentation case in which resale or package switching collapses the intended price gap and explain the pooled alternative.
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