PMGM7004 Global Management from Economics Perspectives
PMGM7004 Overview
- The University of Hong Kong
- First Semester, 2026-27
- Postgraduate management course
- Two-hour closed-book final
- Four assessment components
What this course asks you to do
PMGM7004 uses microeconomic models as management tools. You begin with market boundaries, demand and supply, then learn to distinguish a movement along a curve from a shift of the relationship itself.
- Assessment centre The minimum attendance requirement is 70%; it must be satisfied alongside the four weighted components. Use the course Moodle page to confirm the live attendance record and administration.
- Core method Write the economic relationship, solve the equilibrium or marginal condition, substitute the answer back and interpret its direction.
- Strategic test Choose whether firms control price, quantity or timing before selecting Bertrand, Cournot or Stackelberg.
What you get in the full PMGM7004 Exam Bible
- 9 chapters, 40 pages — every examinable topic
- 22 original practice questions, each with a model answer in the Final exam format
- 9 worked examples, solved the way PMGM7004 marks
- 21 computed figures, redrawn from the course’s own numbers
- Exam-morning plan for the Final exam (60%) — what to revise last, where marks are lost
Free on this page: assessment table, chapter map, one worked example, key terms, FAQ. The rest is in the full exam bible.
How PMGM7004 is assessed
| Component | Weight | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Lecture attendance | 15% | At least 70% attendance required; both Moodle attendance records must be valid |
| Participation and contribution | 10% | Group worksheet submission and presentation when called |
| Homework problem sets | 15% | Three sets; top two grades count; late submissions not accepted |
| Final exam | 60% | Two hours, closed book; 30 November 2026, 7pm to 9pm |
The updated syllabus publishes four numeric components totalling 100%. The minimum attendance requirement is 70% and must be satisfied alongside those components. The best two of three problem sets count, and the final is two hours and closed book. Use the course Moodle page to confirm the live attendance record and administration.
Assessment structure
The four published weights total 100%.
What other students are asking about PMGM7004
- Where can I find lecture notes or study guides for PMGM7004 at HKU?
- The PMGM7004 study guide in AskSia Library covers Global Management from Economics Perspectives in 9 chapters, with the assessment table, a chapter-by-chapter topic map, key terms and a worked example, free to read on this page.
- Is there a final exam in PMGM7004, and how much is it worth?
- Yes. In the offering this AskSia Library guide is built from, Final exam carries 60% of the PMGM7004 mark; the full split is Lecture attendance 15%, Participation and contribution 10%, Homework problem sets 15%, Final exam 60%.
- What does PMGM7004 cover on elasticity, welfare and demand evidence?
- In AskSia Library's PMGM7004 guide, the Elasticity, Welfare and Demand Evidence chapter explains point elasticity, consumer surplus, comparative statics and causal demand measurement.
- What does PMGM7004 cover on costs, competitive output and profit?
- In AskSia Library's PMGM7004 guide, the Costs, Competitive Output and Profit chapter explains opportunity and sunk cost, marginal output, shutdown, entry and long-run equilibrium.
- What does PMGM7004 cover on policy, welfare and externalities?
- In AskSia Library's PMGM7004 guide, the Policy, Welfare and Externalities chapter explains price controls, tax incidence, subsidies, social cost and corrective instruments.
Current PMGM7004 dates
| Date | Item | Control |
|---|---|---|
| 5 November 2026 | Problem Set 1 | Due at 9am before Lecture 5 in the published schedule. |
| 16 November 2026 | Problem Set 2 | Due at 9am before Lecture 8 in the published schedule. |
| 23 November 2026 | Problem Set 3 | Due at 9am before Lecture 10 in the published schedule. |
| 30 November 2026 | Final exam | Published as 7pm to 9pm in the updated syllabus. |
Dates are as published in the updated course syllabus and published Moodle schedule for this offering. Confirm exact deadlines and submission settings in the live LMS.
What PMGM7004 covers
Nine chapters move from market equilibrium and elasticity through cost, welfare and pricing to strategic interaction among firms.
Demand, Supply and Market Equilibrium
market boundaries, shifts, direct and inverse form, excess demand and equilibriumStart with the market boundary
Demand and supply only become useful after the product, place and time period are defined. Demand gives quantity chosen at each price with other determinants fixed; supply gives the seller response.
- Relevant market boundaries
- Direct and inverse demand
- Movements versus shifts
- Excess demand and excess supply
- Competitive equilibrium
- Substitution checks
Elasticity, Welfare and Demand Evidence
point elasticity, consumer surplus, comparative statics and causal demand measurementPercentages make response comparable
Point elasticity multiplies the local slope by price divided by quantity, so a straight demand curve can have constant slope and changing elasticity.
- Point elasticity
- Elastic versus inelastic demand
- Elasticity and revenue
- Consumer surplus
- Comparative statics
- Causal demand identification
Costs, Competitive Output and Profit
opportunity and sunk cost, marginal output, shutdown, entry and long-run equilibriumRelevant cost depends on the decision date
Economic cost includes opportunity cost and excludes expenditure that cannot be recovered under any current option. Fixed and sunk are therefore not synonyms.
- Opportunity and sunk costs
- Fixed and variable costs
- Average and marginal cost
- Competitive output
- Shutdown condition
- Long-run entry and exit
Policy, Welfare and Externalities
price controls, tax incidence, subsidies, social cost and corrective instrumentsTrack values, transfers and lost trades
Competitive equilibrium maximises total surplus when demand represents marginal value, supply represents marginal private cost and no market failure separates private from social consequences.
- Total surplus
- Binding price controls
- Tax incidence
- Subsidy expenditure
- Marginal social cost
- Corrective instruments
Monopoly Pricing and Market Power
marginal revenue, uniform pricing, markup, profit and deadweight lossQuantity and price come from different curves
A monopolist faces market demand and must account for the lower price applied to units already sold when expanding output. Marginal revenue therefore lies below demand.
- Market power
- Total and marginal revenue
- Linear marginal revenue
- Monopoly output and price
- Markup and elasticity
- Deadweight loss
Price Discrimination and Segmentation
three degrees of discrimination, separate demand curves, pooling and accessSorting mechanism comes before pricing formula
Price discrimination requires market power, a way to sort buyers and limits on resale.
- Feasibility conditions
- First-degree pricing
- Second-degree self-selection
- Third-degree segmentation
- Inverse-elasticity pricing
- Pooled demand and access
Static and Sequential Games
dominance, best responses, Nash equilibrium, backward induction and commitmentEquilibrium is mutual best response
A strategic game specifies players, strategies and payoffs.
- Players, strategies and payoffs
- Dominant strategies
- Best responses
- Nash equilibrium
- Backward induction
- Credible commitment
Bertrand and Cournot Competition
price undercutting, quantity best responses and the ranking of oligopoly outcomesThe committed variable selects the model
Bertrand competition treats price as the strategic choice.
- Price versus quantity choice
- Bertrand undercutting
- Price matching
- Residual demand
- Cournot best responses
- Market-structure ranking
Stackelberg Leadership and Entry
leader commitment, follower response, first-mover advantage and entry deterrenceLeadership means anticipating a response
Stackelberg competition is a sequential quantity game. A leader commits first, a follower observes and chooses a Cournot best response, and price follows from total output.
- Follower best response
- Leader optimisation
- Backward induction
- First-mover advantage
- Observable commitment
- Entry deterrence
Elasticity converts those relationships into percentage responses, while surplus measures who gains from exchange.
Cost dynamics and profit maximisation move the analysis inside the firm: opportunity cost enters, sunk cost does not, and output changes until marginal revenue meets marginal cost.
From markets to managerial pricing
The middle chapters compare competitive outcomes with taxes, subsidies, price controls and externalities, requiring every welfare calculation to include transfers and lost trades.
Monopoly pricing then separates the quantity decision from the price read from demand. Price discrimination extends that logic to buyers who are sorted by individual willingness to pay, self-selection or observable segment.
These chapters are calculation-led, but each ends by asking what the number means for output, access, profit or welfare.
From individual choice to strategic interaction
The final chapters make each firm's best action depend on another firm's choice. Static games use dominant strategies, best responses and Nash equilibrium. Sequential games add backward induction and credibility.
Bertrand competition models price choices and undercutting, Cournot competition models capacity choices and intersecting quantity responses, and Stackelberg competition gives a committed leader the ability to anticipate and shape a follower response.
The guide keeps those models separate and uses original numbers so every answer can be recomputed by hand.
How the final shapes revision
The published final is two hours and closed book. The syllabus says its format, amount and difficulty are very similar to the sample, which contains a rapid multiple-choice part followed by linked calculations.
The most relevant preparation materials are the lecture slides and notes, in-class worksheets and solutions, problem-set solutions and the sample paper. This guide follows that priority by pairing concise concept distinctions with cumulative calculations and explicit error checks.
Attendance condition
The published minimum attendance requirement is 70%.
Satisfy that condition alongside the weighted assessment components, and use the course Moodle page to confirm the live attendance record, sign-in and sign-out administration.
Worked example · free
Choose the right oligopoly model before calculating
- 2Identify the strategic variable in each market.
- 3Choose Bertrand or Cournot and justify the mapping.
- 3Write the correct first deviation or best-response calculation.
Key terms
- Market Equilibrium
- The price and quantity at which quantity demanded equals quantity supplied, leaving no excess demand or supply.
- Point Elasticity
- The percentage responsiveness at one point on a relationship, calculated from its derivative and the local price-to-quantity ratio.
- Consumer Surplus
- The difference between buyer willingness to pay and the market price across the units purchased.
- Opportunity Cost
- The value of the best alternative use of a resource, whether or not an accounting payment records it.
- Sunk Cost
- A cost that cannot be recovered under any current option and therefore cannot change the ranking of those options.
- Marginal Cost
- The additional cost of producing one more unit, used with marginal revenue to choose output.
- Deadweight Loss
- The total surplus from mutually beneficial trades that do not occur because a wedge or market power changes quantity.
- Externality
- A cost or benefit imposed on a third party that is not reflected in the private market price.
- Marginal Revenue
- The change in total revenue from one more unit, including the price effect on units already sold.
- Price Discrimination
- Charging different effective prices for the same product when the difference is not explained by cost.
- Best Response
- The strategy that gives a player the highest payoff for a specified strategy chosen by another player.
- Nash Equilibrium
- A strategy profile in which each player's choice is a best response to the choices of the others.
- Bertrand Competition
- An oligopoly model in which firms choose prices and homogeneous-product rivals can profit by undercutting prices above cost.
- Stackelberg Competition
- A sequential quantity game in which a committed leader chooses before a follower observes and best-responds.
PMGM7004 FAQ
What is the assessment split?
The updated syllabus assigns 15% to lecture attendance, 10% to participation and contribution, 15% to homework problem sets and 60% to the final exam. Those numeric rows total 100%. Attendance also carries a published requirement of at least 70%, so it should not be treated as merely another discretionary mark.
What is known about the final exam?
It is published as a two-hour closed-book final on 30 November 2026 from 7pm to 9pm. The syllabus says it will be very similar to the sample in format, amount and difficulty. The sample contains twenty multiple-choice questions for forty points and sixty points of linked calculations.
How does the problem-set rule work?
There are three problem sets and only the top two grades count toward the 15% component. The syllabus says they are due at 9am on their lecture dates, solutions are posted after the relevant lecture and late submissions are not accepted. A random subset of questions may be graded, so ungraded items still matter for revision.
Which topics should I prioritise for the final?
Prioritise the starred syllabus topics: demand and supply, elasticity and welfare, costs and profit maximisation, market efficiency and policy, monopoly, static and sequential games, Bertrand, Cournot and Stackelberg. The syllabus identifies those as the core material and the main focus of problem sets and the final.
How should I use the sample exam?
Use its question types and point allocation without copying its stems. Practise fast conceptual discrimination for the multiple-choice section, then work linked calculations that carry an earlier answer into tax welfare, monopoly policy or entry analysis. The sample instruction that only final calculation answers are graded makes substitution and direction checks especially valuable.
What is the fastest way to check a calculation?
Substitute the result into the original relationship and compare its direction with the economics. Demand must equal supply at equilibrium, buyer and seller prices must differ by the tax, a monopoly price must lie on demand, both Cournot quantities must satisfy best responses, and Stackelberg total output should exceed the comparable Cournot outcome.
Is attendance just part of the 15% mark?
The syllabus publishes a minimum attendance requirement of 70%, to be satisfied alongside the weighted components. The course page explains that both sign-in and sign-out records must be completed within their windows for a lecture record to count. Use the course Moodle page to confirm the live attendance record and administration.
How do I choose between Bertrand and Cournot?
Ask what firms commit before demand is resolved. Posted-price choice points to Bertrand and the profitable deviation is an undercut. Capacity or quantity choice points to Cournot and the calculation is a residual-demand best response. The number of firms alone does not select the model, and timing may move the quantity game to Stackelberg.
Questions students ask in each PMGM7004 chapter
- Why is a price change not a demand shift?
- Price is the variable already traced along a demand curve. When price changes and the other determinants remain fixed, quantity demanded moves to another point on that same relationship. A shift requires a non-price determinant such as income, taste, expectations, buyer numbers or the price of a related good to change. Chapter 01 · Demand, Supply and Market Equilibrium
- Why does elasticity change on a straight demand line?
- The derivative or slope can remain constant while the ratio of price to quantity changes. Point elasticity multiplies those two pieces. Near the price intercept, price is large relative to quantity and demand is elastic; near the quantity intercept, quantity is large relative to price and the same slope produces inelastic demand. Chapter 02 · Elasticity, Welfare and Demand Evidence
- Why can a loss-making firm keep producing?
- In the short run, fixed cost may already be unavoidable. Producing is worthwhile when revenue covers variable cost and contributes something toward that fixed amount. The firm shuts down only when price is below average variable cost at the best positive output. Persistent losses cause exit later when all costs become avoidable. Chapter 03 · Costs, Competitive Output and Profit
- Who bears a tax imposed on sellers?
- Legal remittance does not determine economic incidence. The market creates a wedge between the buyer price and seller receipt, and relative elasticity determines how that wedge is divided. The less elastic side changes quantity less and therefore has fewer alternatives, so it absorbs more of the burden regardless of which side sends the payment. Chapter 04 · Policy, Welfare and Externalities
- Why is marginal revenue below monopoly price?
- Selling an additional unit usually requires lowering the price. The firm gains the price on the new unit but loses revenue because the lower price also applies to units it already sold. That inframarginal price effect makes marginal revenue smaller than price. A competitive firm does not face it because its own output does not move market price. Chapter 05 · Monopoly Pricing and Market Power
- Are all price differences price discrimination?
- No. Different production, delivery or service costs can justify different prices for the same broad product. Temporary experiments and inventory clearance can also explain a gap. The discrimination test compares effective prices after relevant cost differences and then asks whether market power, sorting and limited resale make the difference sustainable. Chapter 06 · Price Discrimination and Segmentation
- Is the highest joint payoff always a Nash equilibrium?
- No. Nash equilibrium asks whether either player can improve by changing alone. A high joint-payoff cell can fail because one player has a profitable unilateral deviation. The prisoner's-dilemma structure makes this vivid: the lower joint outcome is stable while the better joint outcome is vulnerable to individual defection. Chapter 07 · Static and Sequential Games
- Why can two Bertrand firms produce a competitive price?
- With identical products and equal constant marginal cost, either firm can capture demand by pricing slightly below any common price above cost. That logic continues until price reaches marginal cost, where another cut would lose money. Differentiation, capacity limits, search costs or repeated interaction can weaken the result. Chapter 08 · Bertrand and Cournot Competition
- Why does the Stackelberg leader produce more than in Cournot?
- The leader anticipates that the follower's quantity response slopes downward. Committing to more output makes the follower retreat, so the leader captures a larger share of the market. The leader does not treat follower output as fixed; it exploits the response by inserting it into the leader profit calculation. Chapter 09 · Stackelberg Leadership and Entry
How to study for the exam
Build one handwritten method sheet from the lecture relationships, not from chapter summaries.
For each method, write the trigger, the equation and one error check: equate demand and supply; calculate point elasticity with its local ratio; choose competitive output where price equals marginal cost; open a full welfare ledger for policy; derive marginal revenue before monopoly pricing; solve each segment separately only when resale is limited; mark both players' best responses in a matrix; and substitute the follower response before a Stackelberg leader chooses.
Then complete one timed concept set and one linked calculation set on alternating days. Keep an error ledger that names the mistaken relationship, such as reading monopoly price from marginal revenue or treating a joint maximum as Nash equilibrium. Rework that exact step with new numbers before moving on.
In the final week, use the sample exam as a timing frame and verify every final answer by substitution, direction and units.
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