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PMGM7004 Chap.7 Static and Sequential Games

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Chapter 7 of 9 · PMGM7004

Static and Sequential Games

Equilibrium is mutual best response

A strategic game specifies players, strategies and payoffs. Dominant strategies are best against every rival action, but most games require marking best responses and finding cells where no player gains from moving alone. Nash equilibrium predicts unilateral stability rather than the highest joint payoff. Sequential games add observed timing.

Backward induction solves the final decision first and removes threats that would not be carried out when their node arrives. Commitments matter only when they change a later payoff or remove an option.

Mark the matrix systematically

Hold one rival action fixed and compare the current player's payoffs across available choices. Repeat for every rival action, keeping payoff order consistent.

A dominant strategy wins every one of those comparisons. A pure-strategy equilibrium occurs where the response marks for all players meet.

The cell can be inefficient for the players jointly, so compare stability with the joint-payoff maximum without treating the latter as self-enforcing.

Use timing to test promises and threats

In a sequential game, solve the last mover's decision at every final node and replace each node with the payoff that rational continuation creates. Continue backward until the opening choice is reached.

A threat is not credible when carrying it out would make the later mover worse off. A contract, irreversible asset or changed cost can restore credibility by changing that later comparison; an announcement alone cannot.

State both the path and the supporting incentives

A complete answer names the actions expected on the equilibrium path and explains why no player changes at each relevant decision point.

For a commitment, identify the physical, legal or reputational mechanism and the payoff it changes. Reputation requires a repeated setting and future gains sufficient to justify a present sacrifice. These details turn an equilibrium label into a strategic explanation that can be evaluated.

In this chapter

What this chapter covers

  • 01

    Players, strategies and payoffs

  • 02

    Dominant strategies

  • 03

    Best responses

  • 04

    Nash equilibrium

  • 05

    Backward induction

  • 06

    Credible commitment

Worked example · free

Remove an empty entry threat

Q [8 marks]. AskSia-authored practice. The marks shown here are not an official University mark allocation. Entry gives an incumbent a choice between Fight with payoffs -2,1 and Accommodate with payoffs 3,3. Staying out gives 0,5. Solve by backward induction.
Backward induction follows the green branch at the incumbent's node, then returns to the entrant's first choice.Backward induction follows the green branch at the incumbent's node, then returns to the entrant's first choice. The fight branch is visible but not credible because it is worse when that node is reached.EntrantEnterStay out0, 5IncumbentFightAccommodate-2, 13, 3solve the final node first
Backward induction follows the green branch at the incumbent's node, then returns to the entrant's first choice. The fight branch is visible but not credible because it is worse when that node is reached.
  • 3Solve the incumbent's final node.
  • 3Return to the entrant's choice.
  • 2Evaluate the threat to fight.
The incumbent accommodates after entry because 3 exceeds 1. Anticipating that response, the entrant chooses entry because 3 exceeds 0. The threat to fight is not credible unless a commitment changes the incumbent's later incentives.
Sia tip — Judge a threat at the node where it would be carried out, not where it is announced.
Glossary

Key terms

Dominant Strategy
A strategy that gives a higher payoff than alternatives against every opponent action.
Best Response
The highest-payoff strategy against one specified opponent strategy.
Nash Equilibrium
A profile in which every strategy is a best response to the others.
Backward Induction
Solving a sequential game from its final decision nodes back to the first move.
Credible Threat
A threatened action that remains optimal when the decision node is reached.
FAQ

Static and Sequential Games FAQ

Is the highest joint payoff always a Nash equilibrium?

No. Nash equilibrium asks whether either player can improve by changing alone. A high joint-payoff cell can fail because one player has a profitable unilateral deviation. The prisoner's-dilemma structure makes this vivid: the lower joint outcome is stable while the better joint outcome is vulnerable to individual defection.

Can a game have several Nash equilibria?

Yes. Coordination games often contain several cells with mutual best responses, and convention or a focal point may determine which is selected. Other games have no pure-strategy equilibrium and require randomisation. Finding one marked cell does not prove uniqueness; every row and column must be checked systematically.

What turns a threat into a commitment?

The threatened action must become optimal or unavoidable when the later node arrives. An enforceable contract, visible irreversible capacity, a valuable repeated-game reputation or a changed cost structure can do this. A verbal announcement changes none of those incentives and remains cheap talk when reversal is still attractive.

Study strategy

Exam move

For static games, mark the row player's best response in each column and the column player's best response in each row before looking for intersections. For sequential games, cover the early branches and solve every final node first. Keep a separate note for the commitment mechanism, because timing alone does not make an action durable. Explain every equilibrium by naming the deviation that fails.

Redraw one matrix after changing a single payoff and trace exactly which response marks and equilibrium conclusions move.

Working through Static and Sequential Games in PMGM7004? Sia is AskSia’s AI Management tutor — ask any PMGM7004 Static and Sequential Games question and get a clear, step-by-step explanation grounded in how PMGM7004 is taught and assessed. Read this chapter free, then take your hardest questions to Sia.

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