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PMGM7004 Chap.9 Stackelberg Leadership and Entry

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Chapter 9 of 9 · PMGM7004

Stackelberg Leadership and Entry

Leadership means anticipating a response

Stackelberg competition is a sequential quantity game. A leader commits first, a follower observes and chooses a Cournot best response, and price follows from total output. Backward induction requires the follower response to be substituted into the leader's profit before the leader quantity is optimised.

The leader expands beyond its Cournot quantity, the follower retreats, total output rises and price falls. The advantage depends on visible irreversible commitment and can deter entry when follower operating profit falls below the entry fee.

Solve against the calendar

Derive the follower response first because that is the final strategic choice.

Express it as a function of leader quantity, substitute it into market demand and build the leader profit from the resulting margin. Optimise only after the response is inside the objective.

Treating follower quantity as fixed would erase the commitment channel and reproduce a simultaneous Cournot calculation under a sequential label.

Prove that the first move is durable

Moving earlier creates an advantage only when the action is visible and difficult to reverse. Installed capacity, inventory or a binding production contract can make quantity commitment credible.

A forecast or press statement does not, because the supposed leader would later want to revise once the follower reacts. Identify the mechanism and its cost, then check whether it changes the follower response in the way assumed by the calculation.

Separate entry prediction from incumbent profit

An entrant compares expected operating profit after entry with its fixed entry fee.

A commitment can deter when it pushes that continuation profit below the fee. The incumbent must make a different comparison: profit under costly deterrence against profit from accommodating entry or choosing no commitment. A barrier can therefore be credible yet unprofitable. Report both comparisons before recommending capacity or another strategic commitment.

In this chapter

What this chapter covers

  • 01

    Follower best response

  • 02

    Leader optimisation

  • 03

    Backward induction

  • 04

    First-mover advantage

  • 05

    Observable commitment

  • 06

    Entry deterrence

Worked example · free

Solve leadership by substitution

Q [12 marks]. AskSia-authored practice. The marks shown here are not an official University mark allocation. Inverse demand is P = 26 - qL - qF and both firms have marginal cost 2. Find Stackelberg quantities, price and profits.
Backward induction runs against calendar time.Backward induction runs against calendar time. Solve the follower's best response first, substitute it into the leader's profit, and only then choose the leader quantity that will be observed.Leader commitschoose qLFollower observesqF = BRF(qL)Market clearsP(Q), profitssubstitute response before leader chooses
Backward induction runs against calendar time. Solve the follower's best response first, substitute it into the leader's profit, and only then choose the leader quantity that will be observed.
  • 3Derive the follower response.
  • 4Substitute and optimise the leader.
  • 5Recover follower quantity, price and profits.
The follower response is qF = (24 - qL)/2. Substitution gives leader margin 12 - 0.5qL and leader quantity 12. The follower chooses 6, total output is 18 and price is 8. Leader profit is 72 and follower profit is 36.
Sia tip — Solve the follower first even though the leader moves first. Backward induction runs against calendar time.
Glossary

Key terms

Stackelberg Competition
A sequential quantity game with a committed leader and observing follower.
Follower Response
The follower's profit-maximising quantity as a function of the leader quantity.
First-mover Advantage
A payoff gain created by moving first under the game's commitment and response structure.
Commitment
An observable action that is costly or impossible to reverse after another player responds.
Entry Deterrence
A strategy that lowers expected post-entry profit below the cost of entering.
FAQ

Stackelberg Leadership and Entry FAQ

Why does the Stackelberg leader produce more than in Cournot?

The leader anticipates that the follower's quantity response slopes downward. Committing to more output makes the follower retreat, so the leader captures a larger share of the market. The leader does not treat follower output as fixed; it exploits the response by inserting it into the leader profit calculation.

Does moving first always create an advantage?

No. The result depends on the direction of strategic responses and on commitment. Quantity choices are strategic substitutes in the standard Cournot setting, so aggressive leadership makes the follower retreat. In games with different response slopes or without an irreversible visible action, moving first can confer no advantage or even create a disadvantage.

How can capacity deter entry?

Observable irreversible capacity changes the continuation game and can reduce an entrant to the Stackelberg follower profit. Entry is deterred when that expected operating profit falls below the fixed entry fee. The incumbent must still compare the value of deterrence with the cost of installing and using the extra capacity.

Study strategy

Exam move

Use one fixed solution order: derive the follower response, substitute it into inverse demand, construct leader profit, optimise the leader quantity, recover follower quantity and calculate price and profits. Compare the result with Cournot. Then add an entry fee and ask whether follower operating profit covers it. Write the physical or contractual commitment beside every leadership claim.

Compare deterrence profit with accommodation profit so a credible commitment is not automatically mistaken for a profitable strategy.

Working through Stackelberg Leadership and Entry in PMGM7004? Sia is AskSia’s AI Management tutor — ask any PMGM7004 Stackelberg Leadership and Entry question and get a clear, step-by-step explanation grounded in how PMGM7004 is taught and assessed. Read this chapter free, then take your hardest questions to Sia.

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