PMGM7004 Chap.8 Bertrand and Cournot Competition
Bertrand and Cournot Competition
The committed variable selects the model
Bertrand competition treats price as the strategic choice. With homogeneous products, equal constant marginal costs and no capacity constraints, any common price above cost invites a profitable undercut, so equilibrium price falls to marginal cost. Cournot treats quantity or capacity as the strategic choice.
Each firm maximises profit against residual demand, derives a downward-sloping best response and solves the simultaneous intersection.
Additional Cournot firms raise total output and move price toward the competitive benchmark.
Test the undercut with its assumptions visible
The basic Bertrand result relies on buyers treating the products as interchangeable, prices being observed and either firm being able to serve demand won by a small cut.
Differentiation, search frictions or a capacity limit changes the deviation and can sustain prices above marginal cost. A price-matching policy also changes the gain from cutting because the rival may follow immediately.
State which assumption drives the conclusion instead of applying the marginal-cost price as a universal two-firm result.
Derive quantity responses from residual demand
In Cournot, hold the rival quantity fixed, substitute total output into inverse demand and maximise the firm's profit. The resulting response normally slopes downward: more rival output reduces the best own quantity.
Repeat for the other firm and solve the two equations simultaneously. Symmetry is a shortcut only after demand and costs have been shown to match.
Substitution into both responses verifies the intersection.
Use benchmark rankings as an audit
Under common linear assumptions, total output is lowest under monopoly, rises under Cournot, rises again with Stackelberg leadership and reaches the competitive level under equal-cost homogeneous Bertrand. Price moves in the opposite direction.
The ranking gives meaning to an answer and catches many algebra errors, but it does not override changed assumptions. If the order differs, identify whether cost asymmetry, differentiation, capacity or timing explains the result.
What this chapter covers
- 01
Price versus quantity choice
- 02
Bertrand undercutting
- 03
Price matching
- 04
Residual demand
- 05
Cournot best responses
- 06
Market-structure ranking
Worked example · free
Solve a symmetric Cournot market
- 4Derive both quantity best responses.
- 3Solve their intersection.
- 3Recover price and profit.
Key terms
- Bertrand Competition
- A simultaneous game in which firms choose prices.
- Undercutting
- Setting a slightly lower price to capture demand from a higher-priced rival.
- Cournot Competition
- A simultaneous game in which firms choose quantities or capacities.
- Residual Demand
- The demand left for one firm after treating rival output as given.
- Strategic Substitutes
- Choices for which an increase by one player reduces another player's best response.
Bertrand and Cournot Competition FAQ
Why can two Bertrand firms produce a competitive price?
With identical products and equal constant marginal cost, either firm can capture demand by pricing slightly below any common price above cost. That logic continues until price reaches marginal cost, where another cut would lose money. Differentiation, capacity limits, search costs or repeated interaction can weaken the result.
Why do Cournot best responses slope downward?
A rival's larger quantity reduces the residual demand and price available to the firm. The firm's profit-maximising quantity therefore falls as rival quantity rises. Quantities are strategic substitutes. This direction provides a useful check: a derived response that increases one firm's output when its rival expands usually contains a sign error.
How do I decide whether an industry is Bertrand or Cournot?
Identify what firms commit before demand is realised. Posted prices and rapid price adjustment support Bertrand. Capacity reservations, production schedules or shipping commitments support Cournot. The same industry can require different models at different horizons, and sequential quantity commitment can turn Cournot into Stackelberg.
Exam move
For each industry example, write the committed variable and adjustment horizon before selecting the model. Test a proposed Bertrand price with a one-step undercut. For Cournot, build one firm's residual demand, derive its best response and solve the pair. Finish by ranking total output and price against monopoly and competition so an implausible result is caught immediately.
Change one assumption such as product differentiation or capacity and state why the original deviation test no longer produces the same benchmark.
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