13351 Philosophy and Ethics of Mental Health and Wellbeing
13351 Overview
- Postgraduate
- Semester 1, 2026/27
- School of Psychology
- MSc in Mental Health pathway
- Two written summative assessments
What this module asks
Philosophy and Ethics of Mental Health and Wellbeing is a master's module in the School of Psychology at the University of Birmingham, taught on the PGDip and MSc in Mental Health pathways.
- Assessed by writing A case study reflection and an essay of 2000 words each, equally weighted.
- Argue, do not survey One argument defended against its best objection beats a list of positions.
- Keep the clinic in view Carry each philosophical point back to a specific clinical situation.
- Describe before labelling Jaspers and the phenomenologists ask for careful description of experience first.
How 13351 is assessed
| Component | Weight | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Case Study Reflection | 50% | Summative, 2000 words: a published case summarised in no more than 500 to 700 words, then two or three points argued from philosophy and ethics |
| Essay | 50% | Summative, 2000 words: an answer to a selected essay title, defended with philosophical argument |
The module assessment page lists two summative tasks, a case study reflection and an essay, each weighted 50%, and both are described as 2000 words. An overall module mark of 50% or above is needed to pass. Optional formatives, a one-page case study plan and a 500-word blog post, carry no weight. Submission deadlines are set on Canvas.
Assessment structure
Both pieces carry half of the module mark. Each has an optional formative rehearsal: a one-page plan for the case study and a short blog post for the essay.
What 13351 covers
Eleven chapters move from the concept of mental disorder and its critics, through Jaspers and phenomenology, to delusions and the two written assessments.
Mental Health, Mental Illness and Mental Disorder
Intentionality and rationality as marks of the mental, epistemic and moral norms in the manuals, and the language of distressWhat the word mental adds
The opening week asks why psychiatry speaks of mental disorders at all.
- Why psychiatry needs the word mental
- Intentionality and standards of rationality
- Behavioural descriptions in ICD and DSM
- Epistemic norms and moral norms
- Personality disorders and moral failure
- Choosing words for distress
Naturalism, Normativism and Harmful Dysfunction
Boorse's two senses of dysfunction, Cooper's three conditions, Wakefield and Reznek's hybrids, counterexamples and the five models of distressThree families of theory
Following Radden, the lecture sorts accounts of disorder into naturalism, which relies on objectively ascertainable dysfunction, normativism, which relies on harm judged within a framework of values, and hybrid theories that require both.
Testing the definitions
Boorse, Cooper, Wakefield and Reznek each supply a definition, and each meets counterexamples, from rare but healthy traits to diseased plants that cannot be harmed.
- Radden's three families
- Boorse's evolutionary and statistical senses
- Cooper's three conditions for disease
- Wakefield's harmful dysfunction biconditional
- Reznek's hybrid and its questions
- Treatability and the five models of distress
Categorising Mental Disorders in Psychiatry
DSM categories from Kraepelin and DSM-III, five of nine criteria, comorbidity, rigid thresholds and dimensions continuous with normalcyCategories modelled on infection
In the module's podcast, Steven Hyman explains that current classification treats psychiatric disorders as discontinuous categories, separate from health and from one another, a design formalised in DSM-III in 1980 and modelled on infectious disease.
Two errors and an alternative
He argues that comorbidity shows the boundaries between disorders are misplaced and that thresholds between disorder and health are rigid and arbitrary.
- Kraepelin and DSM-III
- Polythetic criteria: five of nine
- Comorbidity and diagnostic silos
- Rigid and arbitrary thresholds
- Dimensions and the blood pressure model
- Genetic evidence and continuity
Szasz and the Myth of Mental Illness
Two ways of existing, illness as deviation from norms, problems in living, coercion and consent in the later Birmingham discussionThe 1960 argument
Szasz's paper in American Psychologist argues that illness is deviation from a norm.
- Physical objects and theoretical concepts
- Brain disease as neurology
- Illness as deviation from a norm
- Problems in living and psychotherapy as ethics
- Force, consent and social control
- Critics and Pickard's reply
Laing, Foucault and the Critique of Psychiatry
The Divided Self, ontological insecurity and the false self, Foucault's history of madness, internalised chains and the medical gazeLaing on persons
Laing argued that we understand one another as persons through a felt, bodily receptiveness, and that a psychiatry seeing people only as mechanisms is itself pathological.
- Laing's method and the look of the other
- Ontological insecurity and implosion
- The divided self and the false self
- Foucault's history of madness
- Internalised chains and the medical gaze
- Objections: romanticising madness and Derrida
Jaspers and the First Biological Psychiatry
Cerebral pathologists, brain mythology, somatic prejudice, scientific pluralism and the unity of soma and psycheThe psychiatry Jaspers faced
Late nineteenth-century German psychiatry, the first biological psychiatry, studied brains under the microscope rather than patients in institutions.
- Cerebral pathologists and the microscope
- Achievements of the first biological psychiatry
- Brain mythology
- Somatic prejudice
- Scientific pluralism
- Soma, psyche and the unknown continent
Jaspers on Understanding, Explaining and the Clinic
Genetic understanding by empathy, causal explanation, primary delusion, Dilthey, Weber, Brentano and Husserl, and Oyebode on clinical practiceTwo kinds of connection
Jaspers distinguished understanding, grasping by empathy how one psychic event emerges from another, from explaining, finding regular causal links by repeated observation.
- Understanding and explaining
- Genetic means origin, not genes
- Un-understandable primary delusion
- Dilthey, Weber, Brentano and Husserl
- Psychopathology as a method
- Criticisms from Minkowski and Oyebode
Phenomenology from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty
The natural attitude, epoche and free variation, Bergson on quality, Heidegger's care, Sartre's Look and Merleau-Ponty's embodied subjectivityA method of description
Phenomenology studies how things present themselves in experience from the first-person point of view.
- Definitions of phenomenology
- Natural attitude and epoche
- Essences and free variation
- Bergson on quality and time
- Heidegger's care and Sartre's Look
- Merleau-Ponty and Objective Thought
Phenomenological Psychopathology and Lived Experience
The minimal self model of schizophrenia, existential feeling in depression, voices and grief, situatedness and the case of Ellen WestDescribing disorder from the inside
Phenomenological psychopathology asks what an experience of disorder is like and what makes one condition that condition rather than another.
- What phenomenological psychopathology asks
- The minimal self and schizophrenia
- Existential feeling and depression
- Voices without sound
- Grief in context
- Situatedness and Ellen West
Delusions and the Psychopathology of Psychosis
Primary and secondary delusions, overvalued ideas, definitions from Sims to ICD-11, Bortolotti's five criteria and epistemic innocenceClinical distinctions
The clinical teaching separates delusions, which are abnormalities of thinking and judging, from hallucinations, and distinguishes primary delusions, secondary delusions that make sense in context, and overvalued ideas pursued beyond reason.
Philosophical analysis
Standard definitions are compared, then tested with Bortolotti's analysis, which rejects falsity and bizarreness as criteria, keeps implausibility and unshakeability, and argues that some delusions can be epistemically innocent.
Why the stakes are practical
Because delusions are often treated as the hallmark of mental disorder and bear on judgements of risk, any revision of the concept must say what clinicians should do instead.
- Why the definition of delusion matters
- Primary, secondary and overvalued ideas
- Sims, Oxford, DSM-5 and ICD-11 definitions
- Bortolotti's five criteria
- Epistemic innocence
- First-rank symptoms and insight
Case Study Reflections and Philosophy Essays
Finding a published case, a 500 to 700 word summary and 2 to 3 argued points, thesis and structure, reading philosophy, integrity and generative AIThe case study reflection
The reflection asks you to find a published case, summarise it in no more than 500 to 700 of its 2000 words, and spend the rest arguing two or three philosophical or ethical points that return to the clinical scenario.
The essay and its habits
The essay guidance centres on a thesis that is either true or false and one argument developed in depth against its best objection.
- Purpose of the case study reflection
- Finding and summarising a case
- Thesis, introduction, body and conclusion
- One argument against its best objection
- Reading philosophy in three passes
- Integrity and generative AI
It describes itself as a research-led introduction to conceptual issues in mental health, aiming to introduce the ethics of psychiatric practice and research together with philosophical psychopathology.
Each week combines about two hours of directed preparation on Canvas, such as recorded lectures, podcasts and quizzes, with a two-hour in-person seminar or lecture.
How the guide is organised
The opening chapters ask what makes a disorder mental, compare naturalist, normativist and hybrid accounts of disorder such as Wakefield's harmful dysfunction, and examine Steven Hyman's critique of psychiatric categories.
Two chapters then set out the antipsychiatry critiques of Szasz, Laing and Foucault. The middle of the guide follows Karl Jaspers from his reaction against the first biological psychiatry to his distinction between understanding and explaining, before tracing the phenomenological tradition from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty and its applications to schizophrenia, depression, voices and grief.
A chapter on delusions compares clinical definitions with Lisa Bortolotti's philosophical analysis.
Built for two written assessments
The module is assessed by a case study reflection and an essay, each of 2000 words and each worth half of the mark.
The final chapter, the practice pages and the submission pages show how to find and summarise a published case, how to build a thesis and defend it against its strongest objection, how to read philosophy in three passes, and what the module requires on integrity and generative AI.
Worked example · free
Decide whether a comforting voice counts as a disorder
- 2State the analysis: a condition is a disorder if and only if it causes harm by cultural standards and results from the failure of a mechanism's evolved function.
- 2Test the harm condition: the case describes comfort rather than harm, so it is not shown to be met.
- 1Test the dysfunction condition: no failing mechanism has been identified in the case.
- 1Conclude: on the hybrid view the experience is not shown to be a disorder, and say what evidence would change that.
Key terms
- Mental Disorder
- A Mental Disorder is a condition whose identification relies on intentional states and capacities judged against standards of rationality and appropriateness.
- Harmful Dysfunction
- Harmful Dysfunction is Wakefield's analysis of disorder as harm by cultural standards combined with failure of an evolved function.
- Naturalism
- Naturalism is the view that disorder can be defined by objectively ascertainable facts such as dysfunction.
- Normativism
- Normativism is the view that disorder is defined by values, so that a disease is a disvalued condition.
- Biomedical Model
- The Biomedical Model is the dominant model of distress, treating it on the pattern of bodily disease.
- Comorbidity
- Comorbidity is the presence of several diagnoses in one person, read by Hyman as a sign of misplaced boundaries.
- Problems in Living
- Problems in Living is Szasz's term for difficulties judged against social and ethical norms rather than illnesses.
- Ontological Insecurity
- Ontological Insecurity is Laing's term for experiencing others as a threat that could swamp one's identity.
- Somatic Prejudice
- Somatic Prejudice is Jaspers's name for assuming that human existence is really a bodily event.
- Genetic Understanding
- Genetic Understanding is Jaspers's grasp, by empathy, of how one psychic event emerges from another.
- Epoche
- The Epoche is Husserl's suspension of belief in the world and its theories so that experience can be described as given.
- Minimal Self
- The Minimal Self is the pre-reflective structure of being a singular subject of experience.
- Epistemic Innocence
- Epistemic Innocence is Bortolotti's term for a costly belief that brings benefits no available alternative could provide.
13351 FAQ
How is this philosophy and ethics module assessed?
By two summative written pieces of 2000 words each, equally weighted: a case study reflection on a published clinical case and an essay answering a selected title. You need an overall module mark of 50% or above to pass. Optional formatives, a one-page case study plan and a 500-word blog post, earn feedback but no marks.
What does the case study reflection involve?
You search for a published case of interest, summarise it in no more than 500 to 700 words, and use the rest of the 2000 words to argue two or three philosophical or ethical points that connect back to the clinical scenario. The module is less keen on a literature review and wants a reasoned conclusion.
Is this module mainly philosophy or mainly psychiatry?
It is philosophy applied to mental health. The readings include philosophers and psychiatrists, and the learning outcomes ask you to assess models of mental health, use conceptual methods, defend your own views with philosophical arguments, and appraise how theories apply to specific situations in clinical practice.
Which thinkers does the module cover?
The weeks with teaching material available here cover Wakefield, Boorse, Cooper and Hyman on disorder and classification, Szasz, Laing and Foucault on antipsychiatry, Karl Jaspers on psychopathology, phenomenologists from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty, and Lisa Bortolotti and clinical textbooks on delusions.
Can I use generative AI in the assessed work?
The module's welcome page says generative AI may not be used to generate content for assessments that count towards the module mark, and you declare this when you submit. It can support learning, for example by summarising lecture ideas, but check the generative AI category on the assessment page before using any tool.
What happens if I do not pass the module?
One reassessment is normally offered in the supplementary period in July and August for any component below 50% that pulled the module below the pass mark. The module mark after reassessment is capped at 50%, and the module advises choosing a different case study or essay question for the resit.
Questions students ask in each 13351 chapter
- Does calling a disorder mental commit you to dualism?
- No. The lecture states that separating the mental from the physical in psychiatry assumes neither that mind and matter are two distinct kinds of substance nor that mental disorders lack physical causes or effects. Mental describes how a condition shows up and is judged: through intentional states and capacities assessed against standards of rationality and appropriateness. Chapter 01 · Mental Health, Mental Illness and Mental Disorder
- What is the difference between naturalism and normativism about disorder?
- Naturalism says disorder is a matter of fact, such as a mechanism failing to perform its function, which science can in principle establish. Normativism says disorder is a matter of value: a condition counts as a disease because it is bad to have. Hybrid views, like Wakefield's, require a factual dysfunction and a harm together. Chapter 02 · Naturalism, Normativism and Harmful Dysfunction
- Why does Hyman think psychiatric categories are a poor choice?
- He argues they were modelled on infectious diseases that you either have or do not have, partly as a reaction to psychoanalysis and antipsychiatry. The evidence since then shows heavy comorbidity, thresholds that are rigid and arbitrary, and traits and risk genes that are continuously distributed, so the categories do not match the phenomena. Chapter 03 · Categorising Mental Disorders in Psychiatry
- What does Szasz mean by the myth of mental illness?
- He means that illness is deviation from bodily norms, so conditions measured against psychosocial, ethical and legal norms are not illnesses at all. Brain diseases are real but are neurological. What gets called mental illness is better understood as problems in living, so mental illness does not exist while psychological and social problems do. Chapter 04 · Szasz and the Myth of Mental Illness
- What is ontological insecurity in Laing's account?
- It is a sense that relations with other people threaten to overwhelm one's identity. Laing, drawing on Sartre's account of being seen, proposed that people with schizophrenia are hypersensitive to being looked at by others. The threat can intensify into implosion, and the person may surrender to others or retreat behind a false self. Chapter 05 · Laing, Foucault and the Critique of Psychiatry
- What was the first biological psychiatry?
- It is the historian Shorter's name for German psychiatry at the end of the nineteenth century, when psychiatrists called themselves cerebral pathologists and studied brains, specimens and the nervous system. It achieved real advances, including Alzheimer's work and the identification of the cause of tertiary neurosyphilis, but overreached and lasted only a few decades. Chapter 06 · Jaspers and the First Biological Psychiatry
- What is the difference between understanding and explaining in Jaspers?
- Understanding grasps from the inside how one psychic event emerges from another, as when an attacked person becomes angry. Explaining finds causal regularities through repeated observation, as natural science does. Jaspers held that both are needed and that neither can replace the other in psychiatry. Chapter 07 · Jaspers on Understanding, Explaining and the Clinic
- What is the epoche in Husserl's phenomenology?
- It is the first stage of his reduction, which puts belief in the world and its explanatory theories, such as natural science and psychology, to one side. An experience can then be studied as it is given, free of beliefs about its causes. In clinical work this becomes interviewing within the reduction, staying theory-naive while listening. Chapter 08 · Phenomenology from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty
- What is the minimal self model of schizophrenia?
- It is the view, associated with Parnas, Sass and colleagues, that schizophrenia involves a profound disruption of the minimal self, the pre-reflective structure of being a singular subject of experience. Its strength is to show diverse symptoms as one structural change; critics in the module say it underplays relations with others and fits voices poorly. Chapter 09 · Phenomenological Psychopathology and Lived Experience
- How do clinicians distinguish a delusion from an overvalued idea?
- Following Oyebode, an overvalued idea is a reasonable, intelligible idea that a person pursues past the limits of reason, so that the person's life revolves around it. It tends to be isolated, emotionally charged and similar to a political or religious conviction, and it usually leads to action, which is not necessarily true of delusions. Chapter 10 · Delusions and the Psychopathology of Psychosis
- Why does the reflection limit the case summary?
- Because marks come from analysis, not retelling. Capping the summary at 500 to 700 words leaves at least 1300 words for two or three argued points. A practical method is to draft the argument first, then write the summary last and cut it until it gives only the facts your argument uses. Chapter 11 · Case Study Reflections and Philosophy Essays
How to prepare for the assessments
Work through the chapters in the order the seminars run, but treat every week as material for the two written pieces. After each week, write one claim you could defend and the strongest objection to it, so that by the consolidation week you have a shortlist for the essay.
Start the case study search early: use the suggested databases, keep three candidate cases with a note on the philosophical issue each raises, and submit the optional one-page plan to test your choice. Read each key paper three times, first to identify the thesis, then to understand the argument, then to evaluate it, and keep notes with page numbers so that paraphrase and citation are easy later.
Before drafting, map the essay as a thesis, one argument, its best objection and a reply, and check that the conclusion says what would change in clinical practice if a reader accepted it. Leave the final session before each deadline for checks only.
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