ECON20005 Competition and Strategy
The Complete Exam Bible · S2 2026ECON20005 Overview
- Faculty of Business and Economics
- Semester 2, 2026
- Undergraduate
- Undergraduate economics subject
ECON20005 Competition and Strategy develops sequential, simultaneous, continuous and mixed-strategy game analysis. It is taught within Faculty of Business and Economics. It is Undergraduate.
- ECON20005 grading Quizzes 10% · Three assignments 10% each · Lecture 5% · Tutorial 5% · Final 50%
- ECON20005 examination The final provides reading time before a two-hour writing period and covers all topics.
- ECON20005 pass condition The aggregate mark is insufficient unless the end-of-semester examination pass condition is also met.
- ECON20005 solving route Represent players, timing, information and payoffs before testing deviations and equilibrium.
How ECON20005 is assessed
| Component | Weight | Format |
|---|---|---|
| Weekly quizzes | 10% | Weekly LMS quizzes during the teaching period |
| Assignment 1 | 10% | Individual assignment |
| Assignment 2 | 10% | Individual assignment |
| Assignment 3 | 10% | Individual assignment |
| Lecture participation and activities | 5% | Participation during lectures |
| Tutorial participation | 5% | Participation during tutorials |
| Final examination · hurdle | 50% | Pass condition applies to the end-of-semester examination |
The current Subject Guide publishes the full assessment table and states that the final examination is a hurdle. It also directs students to the LMS for updated dates.
What ECON20005 covers
Start with Strategic Interaction and Game Anatomy; use Simultaneous Games and Dominance as the turning point; finish by bringing the course together in Mixed Strategies and Indifference.
Strategic Interaction and Game Anatomy
Player · Strategy · Payoff · represent a strategic problem before selecting a solution conceptDefine Player
The course material gives this chapter a concrete anchor: The opening lecture introduces game theory as interdependent decision-making and establishes players, strategies and payoffs.
- Player
- Strategy
- Payoff
- Applying Player
- Limits of Strategy and Payoff
Rules, Timing and Information
Rules of the Game · Information Set · Common Knowledge · distinguish sequential and simultaneous strategic environments through timing and informationDefine Rules of the Game
The course material gives this chapter a concrete anchor: The lecture formalises game assumptions and distinguishes actions, strategies, timing, information and knowledge.
- Rules of the Game
- Information Set
- Common Knowledge
- Applying Rules of the Game
- Limits of Information Set and Common Knowledge
Sequential Games and Game Trees
Game Tree · Decision Node · Terminal Payoff · translate a sequential scenario into nodes, branches and payoffsDefine Game Tree
The course material gives this chapter a concrete anchor: The lecture introduces sequential games and uses game trees to connect order of moves with complete payoff consequences.
- Game Tree
- Decision Node
- Terminal Payoff
- Applying Game Tree
- Limits of Decision Node and Terminal Payoff
Backward Induction and Credibility
Backward Induction · Credible Threat · Subgame · solve a sequential game from later choices and separate credible from empty threatsDefine Backward Induction
The course material gives this chapter a concrete anchor: The lecture extends sequential-game analysis through backward induction, credibility and more complex continuations.
- Backward Induction
- Credible Threat
- Subgame
- Applying Backward Induction
- Limits of Credible Threat and Subgame
Simultaneous Games and Dominance
Payoff Matrix · Dominant Strategy · Dominated Strategy · use payoff comparisons to identify dominance without assuming coordinationDefine Payoff Matrix
The course material gives this chapter a concrete anchor: The lecture introduces pure discrete simultaneous games, payoff matrices and dominance reasoning.
- Payoff Matrix
- Dominant Strategy
- Dominated Strategy
- Applying Payoff Matrix
- Limits of Dominant Strategy and Dominated Strategy
Best Responses and Nash Equilibrium
Best Response · Nash Equilibrium · Unilateral Deviation · derive each best response and test every candidate equilibrium for profitable deviationDefine Best Response
The course material gives this chapter a concrete anchor: The lecture continues discrete strategy games through best-response reasoning and equilibrium selection.
- Best Response
- Nash Equilibrium
- Unilateral Deviation
- Applying Best Response
- Limits of Nash Equilibrium and Unilateral Deviation
Continuous Strategies and Reaction Functions
Continuous Strategy · Reaction Function · Cournot Equilibrium · derive and intersect reaction functions in a continuous-action gameDefine Continuous Strategy
The course material gives this chapter a concrete anchor: The lecture moves from discrete simultaneous games to continuous strategies and reaction-function methods.
- Continuous Strategy
- Reaction Function
- Cournot Equilibrium
- Applying Continuous Strategy
- Limits of Reaction Function and Cournot Equilibrium
Mixed Strategies and Indifference
Mixed Strategy · Expected Payoff · Indifference Condition · solve mixing probabilities by making the opposing player indifferent among supported strategiesDefine Mixed Strategy
The course material gives this chapter a concrete anchor: The lecture combines continuous-strategy review with the introduction of mixed strategies and indifference calculations.
- Mixed Strategy
- Expected Payoff
- Indifference Condition
- Applying Mixed Strategy
- Limits of Expected Payoff and Indifference Condition
It is positioned as Undergraduate economics subject.
The subject moves from strategic representation to increasingly demanding solution concepts, then asks students to interpret equilibrium, credibility and profitable deviation.
Assessment in ECON20005 is distributed as follows: Weekly quizzes 10%; Assignment 1 10%; Assignment 2 10%; Assignment 3 10%; lecture participation and activities 5%; tutorial participation 5%; final examination 50%.
The operational assessment conditions matter here.
The final examination has 15 minutes of reading time and two hours of writing time and covers all subject topics; confirm the exact sitting and permitted materials in the live LMS and timetable.
What makes ECON20005 demanding is concrete: Students must represent timing, information, actions and payoffs accurately, derive best responses rather than guess them, and distinguish an equilibrium from an outcome that merely looks cooperative or profitable.
Students must pass the end-of-semester examination to pass the subject.
For enrolment planning, Confirm current prerequisite and enrolment rules in the University of Melbourne Handbook or live enrolment system.
Start with Strategic Interaction and Game Anatomy; use Simultaneous Games and Dominance as the turning point; finish by bringing the course together in Mixed Strategies and Indifference.
Worked example · free
Integrated practice: resolve the changed evidence
- 2Fix the case-specific meaning and evidential scale of Best Response.
- 2Show the operation or inferential link carried by Nash Equilibrium.
- 2Use Unilateral Deviation to test the strongest plausible alternative.
- 1Report the answer within this limit: Nash equilibrium is a stability condition under unilateral deviation and does not guarantee fairness, efficiency or uniqueness.
Key terms
- Player
- A decision-making actor whose outcome depends on its own choice and the choices made by others.
- Strategy
- A complete contingent plan describing what a player would do at every relevant decision point.
- Payoff
- The numerical ranking or value assigned by a player to an outcome under the stated game representation.
- Rules of the Game
- The specified players, actions, timing, information and payoff consequences that define the strategic environment.
- Information Set
- A collection of decision nodes a player cannot distinguish when choosing an action.
- Common Knowledge
- Information that every player knows, knows others know, and treats as recursively shared in the game.
- Game Tree
- A branching representation of moves, information and resulting outcomes in a sequential game.
- Decision Node
- A point at which a specified player chooses among the available actions.
- Terminal Payoff
- The payoff vector attached to a completed path after all relevant moves have occurred.
- Backward Induction
- A solution method that begins at later decision nodes and replaces each continuation with the choosing players preferred feasible action.
- Credible Threat
- A threatened action that remains optimal for the player if the decision point is actually reached.
- Subgame
- A part of a sequential game beginning at a valid decision node and containing all of its successors without cutting an information set.
ECON20005 FAQ
Where is the hardest reasoning in Competition and Strategy?
Students must represent timing, information, actions and payoffs accurately, derive best responses rather than guess them, and distinguish an equilibrium from an outcome that merely looks cooperative or profitable.
How is assessment distributed across this subject?
The published structure allocates 10% to weekly quizzes, 10% to each of three individual assignments, 5% to lecture participation, 5% to tutorial participation, and 50% to the final examination. ECON20005 Competition and Strategy develops sequential, simultaneous, continuous and mixed-strategy game analysis.
What is published about the final examination?
The current Subject Guide specifies 15 minutes of reading time followed by two hours of writing time and says the examination covers all subject topics. Confirm the sitting and permitted materials live.
Which pass condition applies beyond the aggregate mark?
Students must pass the end-of-semester examination to pass the subject. Treat that examination condition separately from the weighted total and verify all current operational details in the live LMS.
Which teaching period does this Competition and Strategy resource cover?
It is aligned to Semester 2, 2026; confirm your enrolled class and timetable in the current institutional system. ECON20005 Competition and Strategy develops sequential, simultaneous, continuous and mixed-strategy game analysis.
Who controls the official rules for Competition and Strategy?
The university does. This is an independent ECON20005 study resource; current institutional instructions remain authoritative for assessment operation. ECON20005 Competition and Strategy develops sequential, simultaneous, continuous and mixed-strategy game analysis.
Questions students ask in each ECON20005 chapter
- How does Player help a student represent a strategic problem before selecting a solution concept?
- Represent a strategic problem before selecting a solution concept. The opening lecture introduces game theory as interdependent decision-making and establishes players, strategies and payoffs. A decision-making actor whose outcome depends on its own choice and the choices made by others. Chapter 01 · Strategic Interaction and Game Anatomy
- Why is it important to distinguish sequential and simultaneous strategic environments through timing and information?
- Distinguish sequential and simultaneous strategic environments through timing and information. The lecture formalises game assumptions and distinguishes actions, strategies, timing, information and knowledge. The specified players, actions, timing, information and payoff consequences that define the strategic environment. Chapter 02 · Rules, Timing and Information
- What must survive the move required to translate a sequential scenario into nodes, branches and payoffs?
- Translate a sequential scenario into nodes, branches and payoffs. The lecture introduces sequential games and uses game trees to connect order of moves with complete payoff consequences. Chapter 03 · Sequential Games and Game Trees
- Which inputs and assumptions control the attempt to solve a sequential game from later choices and separate credible from empty threats?
- Solve a sequential game from later choices and separate credible from empty threats. The lecture extends sequential-game analysis through backward induction, credibility and more complex continuations. Chapter 04 · Backward Induction and Credibility
- When is it appropriate to use payoff comparisons to identify dominance without assuming coordination?
- Use payoff comparisons to identify dominance without assuming coordination. The lecture introduces pure discrete simultaneous games, payoff matrices and dominance reasoning. A table that records each players payoff for every combination of represented actions. Chapter 05 · Simultaneous Games and Dominance
- Which inputs and assumptions control the attempt to derive each best response and test every candidate equilibrium for profitable deviation?
- Derive each best response and test every candidate equilibrium for profitable deviation. The lecture continues discrete strategy games through best-response reasoning and equilibrium selection. A strategy that maximises a players payoff given the strategies selected by the other players. Chapter 06 · Best Responses and Nash Equilibrium
- Which inputs and assumptions control the attempt to derive and intersect reaction functions in a continuous-action game?
- Derive and intersect reaction functions in a continuous-action game. The lecture moves from discrete simultaneous games to continuous strategies and reaction-function methods. A strategy selected from a range of possible numerical values rather than from a short discrete list. Chapter 07 · Continuous Strategies and Reaction Functions
- Which inputs and assumptions control the attempt to solve mixing probabilities by making the opposing player indifferent among supported strategies?
- Solve mixing probabilities by making the opposing player indifferent among supported strategies. The lecture combines continuous-strategy review with the introduction of mixed strategies and indifference calculations. Chapter 08 · Mixed Strategies and Indifference
How to study for the exam
Draw the game, derive each players response, test unilateral deviations, solve a changed payoff version and interpret the result before checking live examination details.
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